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The Expressive Role of Traditional Semantic Vocabulary: 'True' and 'Refers'

It was when I said,
"There is no such thing as the truth,"
That the grapes seemed fatter.
The fox ran out of his hole.

You . . . You said,
"There are many truths,
But they are not part of a truth."
Then the tree, at night, began to change.

WALLACE STEVENS, "On the Road Home"

I. FROM INFERENCE TO TRUTH, REFERENCE, AND REPRESENTATION

1. Discursiveness, Sapience, and Sentience

We are the creatures who say 'we'—who can explicitly take or treat someone as one of us. Adopting this practical attitude is adopting a discursive normative stance: attributing propositionally contentful commitments and entitlements, and attributing to those to whom we attribute them in turn the practical recognition of such deontic statuses by their corresponding acknowledgment and attribution of them. Sapience of the sort distinctive of us is a status achieved within a structure of mutual recognition: of holding and being held responsible, of acknowledging and exercising authority. The specifically *discursive* character of that normative social structure—what makes it appropriate to interpret the statuses we institute by our deontic scorekeeping activities as having their significance determined by *propositional* contents—consists in the *inferential* articulation of those recognitive practices. We are the ones who give and ask for *reasons* for what we say and do.

Propositionally contentful commitments are picked out in the first instance as those that can both serve as and stand in need of reasons; it is playing an appropriate role in the practices of giving and asking for reasons that confers propositional contents on commitments and the performances

that express them. Offering a reason is making a claim—performing a speech act with the force or significance of an assertion, the undertaking (by overt, explicit acknowledgment) of a doxastic commitment. Practices in which performances are accorded assertional significance deserve for that reason to be called *linguistic* practices. That what one interprets a community as producing and consuming are *reasons* is not something that can be achieved simply by a stipulation to that effect on the part of the interpreter. Rather, the interpretation must attribute to the community practices that incorporate a suitable structure of *inheritance* of *entitlement* to the commitments the practitioners are understood as undertaking and attributing. Such a structure arises out of the interaction of two different dimensions: the intercontent, intrapersonal *consequential* inheritance of entitlement, and the intracontent, interpersonal *testimonial* inheritance of entitlement. Each deontic attitude on the part of a scorekeeper is the attribution to (or acknowledgment by) an interlocutor of a deontic status having a certain content. What it means for commitments with *different* contents to be undertaken by or attributed to the *same* interlocutor, and for commitments undertaken by or attributed to *different* interlocutors to have the *same* content, is to be understood in terms of this broadly inferential structure of justification and communication.

We are sentient creatures as well as sapient ones, but our sentience is different from that of those who cannot give and ask for reasons. Described in the language of physiology, our sensing may be virtually indistinguishable from that of nondiscursive creatures. But we not only sense, we also perceive. That is, our differential response to sensory stimulation includes noninferential acknowledgment of propositionally contentful doxastic commitments. Through perception, when properly trained and situated, we find ourselves passively occupying particular positions in the space of reasons.

We are practical creatures, as well as linguistic ones, but our purposive activity is different from that of those who cannot give and ask for reasons. Described in the language of physiology, our motor activity may be virtually indistinguishable from that of nondiscursive creatures. But we not only produce performances, we perform actions. The performances we produce include noninferential responses to acknowledgments of propositionally contentful[1] practical commitments. Through action, when properly trained and situated, we can respond to the particular positions we occupy in the space of reasons by actively altering the nondiscursive environment.

Our mammalian cousins, primate ancestors, and neonatal offspring—who are sentient and purposive but not discursive creatures—are interpretable as perceiving and acting only in a derivative sense. An interpreter can make sense of what they do by attributing propositionally contentful intentional states to them, but the interpreter's grasp of those contents and of the significance of those states derives from mastery of the richer practices of giving and asking for reasons for the sort of doxastic and practical discursive com-

mitments that are not attributed to these simpler folk. The activities they are interpreted as engaging in do not suffice to confer anything recognizable as propositional contents on their states, attitudes, and performances. Our discursive practices make us semantically autonomous in a sense in which their nondiscursive practices do not.

2. *Making and Taking Reasons, Seeking and Speaking Truths*

An account has been offered of practices that are, it is claimed, sufficient to confer genuinely propositional contents on our states, attitudes, and performances. For a sentence to express such a content is for its proper use to be determined by the norms implicit in assertional practices such as those described in Chapters 3 and 4. Even if that account is accepted, however, it is not obvious from what has been said so far why various features of the discursive scorekeeping model ought to be treated as *necessary* for propositional contentfulness. It might be granted that treating a community as engaging in the sort of linguistic social practices described in Chapters 3 and 4 ought to count as interpreting them as instituting doxastic and practical deontic statuses with assertible and therefore propositional contents—as in this sense doing what we discursive interpreters do—while insisting that the linguistic and social dimensions of these attributed practices are not needed for the states creatures are taken to have to deserve to count as propositionally contentful. Responding to this sort of objection requires looking more closely at the notion of propositional content.

The account elaborated in Part 1 of this work focuses exclusively on one way of understanding what it is to exhibit such contents: in terms of inferential articulation, above all playing a premissory role in reasoning. As was acknowledged at the outset of this investigation, however, there is another, perhaps more familiar route to understanding the sort of sapience being called on to do demarcational duty. It begins with the concept of *truth*, rather than that of *inference*. We are believers, and believing is taking-true. We are agents, and acting is making-true. To be sapient is to have states such as belief, desire, and intention, which are propositionally contentful in the sense that the question can appropriately be raised under what circumstances what is believed, desired, or intended would be *true*. Understanding such a content is grasping the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for its truth.

Something has been said about why understanding ourselves as makers and takers of reasons entails understanding ourselves as seekers and speakers of truths; acknowledging a doxastic commitment is taking-true, and producing an assertional performance is putting a claim forward as true. This discussion at best offers only a starting point, however, from which an account of the relation between the theoretical concepts of inference and truth might depart. It needs to be supplemented by an account of the sort of socially articulated inferential role something must play in order to have a

propositional content in the sense of having truth conditions. Theorists who begin by associating sentences or states with truth conditions—whether by bare stipulation or, more ambitiously, by exhibiting practical proprieties of use or function sufficient to confer such contents (so the association is established by the creatures being interpreted rather than the interpreter)—can then derive from that association various norms governing inference. For the inference from p to q can be understood as correct (in the sense of commitment-preserving) just in case the truth conditions of p are a subset of the truth conditions of q.[2] An account such as the present one, which pursues the converse direction of explanation by understanding propositional contents in the first instance in terms of proprieties of inference, accordingly owes a corresponding story about assessments of truth and the association of truth conditions with sentences and the beliefs they express.

In order to turn a construal of the practical attitude of taking-true (as undertaking an inferentially articulated doxastic commitment) into an account of the sort of grasp of the propositional content of a state or utterance that consists in associating truth conditions with it, it is necessary to understand the expressive role played by 'true' in its various uses. What must an interpreter be doing for it to be correct to take what is being associated with the utterances and intentional states of those interpreted to be *truth* conditions? An answer to this question has to explain how an expression (possibly in an alien language) needs to be used—what practical proprieties its employment must be subject to—in order for it properly to be understood as meaning 'true'. In the context of the present project, such an account is subject to two further criteria of adequacy.

First, the vocabulary used to specify the expressive role played by 'true' and its cognates must be that provided by the inferentially and socially articulated deontic scorekeeping model of discursive practice. That is, it is necessary to show how that model can be extended to include truth talk. For the only locutions officially acknowledged to be intelligible within the confines of this work are those that can be understood as having just the contents that are conferred on them by the role they play in discursive practice. So the issue is what one would need to do to add the expressive power provided by 'true' to the game of giving and asking for reasons as so far specified.

Second, the inferentialist order of explanation is committed to showing why expressions, performances, and intentional states having semantic contents that are propositional in the sense of being assertible—here construed roughly as both being capable of serving as a reason and potentially standing in need of reasons—therefore are also appropriately talked about as having contents that are propositional in the sense of having truth conditions. What is the connection between these two ways of picking out the propositional? Both of these explanatory demands can be addressed by showing what it is about the inferentially and socially articulated deontic scorekeeping prac-

tices (which according to the story being told here confer propositional contents) that 'true' has the job of expressing explicitly (that is, in assertible, so propositional, form).

3. *The Representational Dimension of Discursive Practice*

The need for an account of truth talk in broadly inferential terms is only part of a larger methodological requirement: that the *representational* dimension of intentionality and discourse be addressed. The concept of representation lies at the center of the theoretical idioms typically used today to discuss intentional and semantic contentfulness. It has been at least since Descartes forged his worldview in the bifurcated mold, one side of which consists of representings and the other of representeds—the former conceived as discursive, on the model of algebraic equations, the latter as geometric, on the model of the figures those equations determine. Four aspects of that representational idiom deserve special attention.

First, in addition to the use of 'true' to formulate a semantic approach to sentences in terms of truth values and truth conditions, the tradition to which the later Frege gave birth uses 'refers' or 'denotes' to express the representational relations terms and predicates stand in. Tarski's discussion of truth definitions for formalized first-order languages[3] provides a paradigm of how the use of 'true' and of 'refers' or 'denotes' ought to be understood to be related to each other.

Second, in tandem with this semantic focus on truth and reference is a distinction between extensional and intensional contexts. Central among the latter (which are the source of special explanatory difficulties in the representationalist context) are propositional-attitude-ascribing locutions, paradigmatically ". . . believes that . . ." An account must be offered of the different semantic behavior of these two classes of locutions—a difference that can be roughly rendered in the traditional terminology as the distinction between contexts for which only what is represent*ed* matters for the inferential significance of sentences exhibiting those contexts, on the one hand, and contexts in which represent*ing*s themselves are somehow involved in determining such inferential significances, on the other.

Besides these technical semantic notions crafted by self-conscious theorists in the representationalist tradition, there are locutions in ordinary language that are used to express claims concerning what people are talking or thinking *about.* Prime among these ordinary representational locutions is the use of 'of' in *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitudes, as in "Royce believed *of* the author of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* that he was a great philosopher" or "What James said about tough- and tender-minded thinkers is true *of* Kant, but not true *of* Hegel." The nontechnical notion of intentional *aboutness* that figures in the fundamental pretheoretical distinction between what people are talking or thinking about and what they say or think about it is to be

understood in terms of what is expressed by the use of these *de re* specifications of the contents of intentional states and the utterances that express them. It is from these roots in ordinary conversational practice that more technical representational concepts are elaborated.

Finally there is the crucial idea of *objective* representational proprieties of judging and inferring. It is a feature of our assessments of the application of at least some concepts that we take it that besides correctness of discursive attitude in the sense of entitlement to the commitment undertaken—the concept-user being *justified* in the application, either noninferentially by observable circumstance, inferentially by concomitant commitments and entitlements, or deferentially by available testimony—there is also a kind of correctness that is determined by how things are with what is represented. Whether the application of a concept is correct or incorrect in this sense is independent of the attitudes of the one applying the concept. ("Full many a gem of purest ray serene / The dark unfathom'd caves of ocean bear: / Full many a flower is born to bloom unseen, / And waste its sweetness in the desert air.")[4] Making sense of this fundamental characteristic of our linguistic practice means funding a notion of discursive *success* (both doxastic and practical) that transcends our attitudes (our takings and tryings) and answers instead to the *objects* those attitudes address. Such success is determined by the properties of those objects and by the relations they stand in. A certain sort of social and inferential articulation of attitudes must be shown to institute proprieties and confer contents such that what it is correct to conclude or to claim and what one has actually done depends on how the objects referred to, talked about, or represented in one's discursive attitudes actually are. Talk of objective representational conceptual contents involves both representation of objects and objective proprieties of representation. It remains to be seen what these are and how they are related.

On the face of it, acknowledgment and analysis of conceptual proprieties that are objective in this sense would seem simply to be incompatible with a social-phenomenalist approach to norms. For what is distinctive of such an approach is precisely its treating the norms that govern our discursive conduct as instituted ultimately by our *attitudes*. How, then, can such an approach hope to make intelligible a notion of attitude-*transcendent* discursive norms? The answer takes the form of specifying a certain sort of *stance*—a constellation of attitudes that can be understood as taking or treating certain sorts of assessments *as* answering to facts concerning the objects represented rather than to anyone's attitudes toward or claims about them. Understanding what it is to adopt such a representational stance toward (or interpretation of) what we do is understanding the *implicit* practical attitudes that are expressed *explicitly* by our use of representational locutions—both the technical semantic tropes involving 'true' and 'refers' and the *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude used in ordinary language to make clear what has been achieved in the way of communication or action. Indeed, it is just

the aspects of conceptual content made explicit by these representational locutions that turn out to require that the practices conferring those contents be specifically *linguistic social* practices of the sort outlined in the previous chapter.

4. *Inference, Substitution, and Anaphora*

The various representational tropes just considered all involve associating semantic contents with *sub*sentential expressions—above all, singular terms and predicates. The understanding of reference to objects, of the distinction between extensional and intensional occurrences of expressions, of *de re* locutions, and of the notion of the truth of at least some claims as a normative status or propriety that answers to the properties objects have (and the relations they stand in) rather than those anyone *takes* them to have (or stand in) all involve grasping—either implicitly as a practitioner or explicitly as a theorist—conceptual contents that are not propositional. No account of this sort of conceptual content has yet been offered here. The semantic contentfulness of sentential expressions has been derived from the role they play in inferences, as premises and conclusions; the semantic contentfulness of expressions in the grammatical categories of singular terms and predicates cannot consist in their playing inferential roles in this sense. The notion of conceptual content must accordingly be broadened beyond the propositional in order to give it application beyond the category of sentences.

The inferentialist order of semantic explanation was given its modern form by the young Frege, whose definition of *begriffliche Inhalt* motivates one strand of the model developed here. (The social, practical, and specifically linguistic dimensions of that model—and to some extent the understanding of the normative one as well—are rooted elsewhere.) One of Frege's most important ideas is his strategy for extending broadly inferential notions of content to subsentential expressions, which cannot serve as premises and conclusions of inferences. The key theoretical concept he introduces for that purpose is *substitution*. His idea is that the way in which sentences are related to one another when one results from the other by substituting one subsentential expression for another confers an *indirectly* inferential role on the occurrence of subsentential expressions. Roughly, subsentential expressions can be sorted into equivalence classes that can be thought of as having the same conceptual content in an extended sense. For they can be assimilated insofar as substitution of one for another does not alter some feature of the inferential role of the sentences they are substituted into—paradigmatically, insofar as such substitution does not turn any materially good inferences those sentences are involved in into materially bad inferences. It is this methodology for carving up sentences into semantically significant subsentential parts by noting inferential invariants under substitution that he elabo-

rates into the theory of *functions,* which throughout his later work he takes to be one of his greatest intellectual contributions.

In Chapter 6 Frege's notion of substitution is used to investigate the fine structure of the inferential roles conferred on sentences (and the states whose contents they express) by discursive scorekeeping practices of the sort already discussed. The key notion is that of substitution *inferences:* those whose conclusions are substitutional variants of their premises. The scorekeeping significance of the occurrence of singular terms and predicates is explained by their association with substitution-inferential *commitments.* These are commitments to the propriety of a particular range of substitution inferences: those that exhibit a certain pattern preserving the deontic status of doxastic or practical commitment in the passage from premise to conclusion. In these terms it is possible to explain what it means for propositionally contentful sentences to represent objects as exhibiting properties and standing in relations—and as a consequence to offer an account of the distinction between extensional and intensional sentential contexts in which such subsentential expressions may occur. The official theoretical semantic apparatus is accordingly deepened and made more powerful by adding to the notion of *inference* that of *substitution.*

Both the sentential inferential story about conceptual contents and the subsentential substitutional one rely essentially on the *repeatability* of intentional states and their linguistic expressions. Sharpening the analytic focus, Chapter 7 explores the structures by which conceptual repeatables are constructed out of unrepeatables. Descending to this level is necessary, to begin with, in order to understand the conceptual content (and so pragmatic scorekeeping significance) of deictic or demonstrative responses to the nondiscursive environment within which discursive practice is conducted. Such unrepeatable but conceptually articulated responses make a crucial contribution to empirical cognition, in particular in its relation to practical action. Indexicals (the paradigm of expression-types, tokenings of which uttered by different individuals on different occasions are grammatically guaranteed to have different significances) are only a particularly obtrusive special case of a much more general phenomenon, however—one that is fundamental to the very possibility of interpersonal communication and comprehension. Even if attention is restricted to nonindexical expression types, the ubiquity of differences in collateral beliefs or commitments across interlocutors ensures that lexically cotypical utterances issuing from different mouths will often have very different deontic significances.

It will emerge that talk of the *representational* dimension of discourse is in fact addressed to the *social-inferential* mechanisms by means of which communication can nonetheless be secured across such doxastic gaps. These mechanisms are examined in deontic scorekeeping terms in Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 8, which discusses various forms of *ascription* of conceptually contentful deontic statuses and attitudes, looks at the expressive power of the locutions used to make various aspects of these mechanisms proposition-

ally *explicit*. As always, such explicitating vocabulary is intelligible only against the background of an understanding of the *implicit* practices that such vocabulary makes it possible to express in explicit (assertible) form.

The most important underlying structure is that of *anaphora*, the paradigm of which is the relation a pronoun stands in to its antecedent. In Chapter 7, treating one expression tokening as anaphorically dependent on another (whether they are uttered by the same or by different interlocutors) is explained as taking the substitution-inferential significance of producing the dependent tokening to depend in a certain way on the substitution-inferential significance of producing its antecedent tokening. In other words, anaphora is construed as a special mechanism for the *inheritance* of substitution-inferential commitments. The third component of the theoretical semantic idiom employed here is accordingly *anaphora*. The result is a three-tiered semantic structure: *inference*, *substitution*, and *anaphora* (ISA for short).

5. *'True' and 'Refers'*

This chapter looks at the expressive function of the technical semantic vocabulary that has been employed by theorists outside the minority inferentialist tradition pursued here. On the side of sentences, the central locution is 'true', while on the side of subsentential expressions, it is 'refers' or 'denotes'. The discussion of the way these expressions work plays a dual role in the exposition of the account of discursive practice presented here: retrospectively as offering some of the justification for the decision to focus on *inferential*, rather than *representational*, semantic primitives (announced in Chapter 2), and prospectively as motivating the descent to *substitutional* inferential substructures in Chapter 6 (culminating in the treatment of *anaphora* in Chapter 7). For on the first, or retrospective, point, it is argued here that once the *expressive* function of 'true' and 'refers' is properly understood, it is seen to be incompatible with the *explanatory* function those locutions have been accorded in the dominant semantic theoretical tradition.[5] Insofar as this case can be made out, it makes urgent the demand for alternatives to these semantic primitives—precisely the demand that the inferentialist semantic program pursued here seeks to satisfy.

On the second, or prospective, point, the account of the expressive role of 'true' and 'refers' that is arrived at in this chapter construes them as functioning *anaphorically*. They are anaphoric proform-forming operators; the paradigmatic use of 'true' is to construct a special kind of pro*sentence*, while the paradigmatic use of 'refers' is to construct a special kind of pro*noun*. The expressive role of traditional representationalist semantic vocabulary can be rendered only in the broadly inferentialist idiom used to specify the model of discursive practice offered here, then, inasmuch and insofar as that model can be extended so as to encompass the attribution by deontic scorekeepers of specifically *anaphoric* relations between the significance of various expres-

sion tokenings. This is a promissory note that is redeemed two chapters later, after the substitutional raw materials required have been brought onboard. Once that has been done, an account will have been offered in systematic terms of why it is useful to talk about intentional contentfulness in terms of truth and reference, even though the practices that confer the contents these locutions express should be understood rather in terms of reasons and proprieties of inference.

The previous two chapters presented a model of social linguistic practices. A fundamental criterion of adequacy for such a social-practical model of discursiveness or intentionality is that it be possible to show in the idiom it provides that the normative significances those practices institute are sufficient to confer genuinely propositional contents on states, attitudes, performances, and expressions that are suitably caught up in them. To do that, it is necessary to explain how the social-inferential articulation of those practices can amount to objective representational content. Such an explanation in turn requires an account, in terms of the social and inferential articulation of the pragmatic significances instituted by deontic scorekeeping, of what we are saying when we make claims about what our claims and beliefs represent or are about. The philosophical elaboration of these representational notions uses the technical vocabulary of truth and reference. But what are we saying when we say that a claim is true, or that a term refers to an object?

It is natural, and not obviously inappropriate, to understand these notions themselves in representational terms. To do so is to take '. . . is true' to denote a property of claims and beliefs, and so of the sentences that express them, and to understand '. . . refers to . . .' as denoting a relation between words and the world, between linguistic or intentional items and nonlinguistic, nonintentional ones. Now a great many of our beliefs *are* true, and a great many of our terms *do* refer to objects. But it is necessary to be careful about what assumptions are made concerning what is being said when these claims are made. For exactly what we are saying when we make these true claims—indeed, what we are *doing* when we do so—is of critical importance for determining what *explanatory* role such claims are suited for.

The discussion of representational locutions in the rest of this work moves on two tracks: one having to do with technical representational terms employed by semantic theorists to make explicit various important features of the conceptual contents they address, the other with the locutions of ordinary language practitioners use to make explicit the representational dimension of the doxastic and practical commitments they attribute and undertake. Together these discussions seek to make clear what the representational purport implicit in our discursive practices consists in. This chapter looks to specify the actual expressive role played by the technical terms 'true', 'refers', 'denotes', and their cognates. In order to do this precisely and clearly, it seeks to show how vocabulary playing that expressive role can be introduced into and understood in terms of the fundamental model of discursive practice

offered in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. It also argues that once this expressive role is properly understood, it becomes clear that representational locutions are not suited to play the role of primitives in a semantic theory. Nailing down this point requires looking at their actual expressive role, which is not capturable in the sort of representational semantic theory that uses these notions as primitives; it is therefore necessary to work in another one. The conclusion one arrives at by such an analysis is that some other sort of semantic theory is needed. So the broadly inferential approach introduced in Chapter 3 serves both as the use-language in which the argument is conducted and as the answer to the question that is raised by seeing the inadequacy of truth and reference locutions to serve as fundamental semantic explanatory vocabulary—namely, if semantics ought not to be done in terms of truth conditions for sentences and reference and denotation for singular terms and predicates, what semantic primitives ought to be employed?[6]

The rhetorical situation at this point is complex, and there is a danger that the conclusion that the traditional semantic primitives are inappropriate for explanatory purposes (though quite in order for expressive ones) might be taken to be a result that depends on the inferentialist semantic metalanguage being employed. In fact this thought about the use of 'true' and 'refers' can be motivated independently, and that is the tack taken here. So the analysis of traditional representational semantic vocabulary in this chapter could have been presented before inferential approaches to semantics were introduced in Chapter 2, in order to motivate the search for some new semantic primitives—since most theorists use truth and reference as much because they cannot think of an alternative as for any other reason. But this order of explanation would give too much prominence to the notions of truth and reference; the model being pursued here can be motivated apart from the troubles of this semantic tradition. The expressive role of traditional semantic vocabulary is explained here in terms of *anaphora*, and the argument that this is the right way to understand 'true' and 'refers' is conducted independently of the considerations of the previous chapters. The notion of anaphora that is appealed to is in principle equally available to the representationalist, who will think of it just as grammatically guaranteed coreference.[7] This neutral analysis is then supplemented by showing, in Chapter 7, how anaphora is to be understood according to the inferentialist model of Chapter 3.

II. TRUTH IN CLASSICAL PRAGMATISM

1. *Stereotypical Pragmatism*

The popular conception of the theory of truth of classical pragmatism is summed up in the slogan "The truth is what works." According to this view, the pragmatists were trying to give a theory of truth in the sense of offering necessary and sufficient conditions for possession of that property.

Their innovation is then seen to consist in taking the possession of this property by a belief to consist in a relation not simply to what is believed but also to what is desired. Working, or being satisfactory, involves a further argument place beyond the standard representational or correspondence notion, for it is relative to preferences, purposes, interests, needs, or some such satisfiable practical states.[8]

A theory of truth, on this line, is generically a pragmatic one if it treats truth as the property of conducing to the satisfaction of some state associated with the believer—paradigmatically desire. Specific versions of this genus of explanation will be distinguished by how they understand the state, its subject, and the sort of satisfactoriness involved. Thus within the pragmatic genus truth might be identified with properties as various as evolutionary adaptiveness for a species and optimality for felt-preference maximization by a time-slice of an individual agent.

This sort of understanding of truth as a property of utility for some end—a matter of how useful, in some sense, it is to hold the belief that is a candidate for truth—may be called 'stereotypical pragmatism'. It is important to notice what sort of a theory it is. Pointing out the apparent appropriateness on some occasions of questions such as, I believe that the theory works (for instance, makes correct predictions) but how do I know it is true? already shows that this sort of pragmatism is very implausible if it is conceived as elucidating our concept of truth.[9] As Dewey was well aware, views of this stripe can best be maintained as revisionary proposals—not as accounts of what we mean by 'true' but as suggestions that we stop using that concept and get along instead with the pragmatist's notion of utility.

Any assessment of the merits of such a proposal depends on an account of what the role of the concept of truth is, what explanatory uses the property of truth is wanted for. For only in that context can it be argued that some utility notion would better serve those ends or play that role. The significance of the classical pragmatists in the present story derives from their contribution to that antecedent question—the question of what expressive and explanatory work is and ought to be done by the truth concept. Although their account of the role of truth talk cannot, in the end, be counted as correct, it nevertheless provides the central idea around which an adequate account can be constructed. The answer that eventually emerges as to the role of 'true' makes it hard to see how stereotypical pragmatism, even as a revisionary proposal, can amount to anything other than changing the subject, sharing only a homonym with ordinary truth talk.

2. *Five Theses of Classical Pragmatism*

There is no question that the classical American pragmatists at times commit themselves to what has just been called 'stereotypical pragmatism about truth'. But there is a deeper and more interesting explanatory

strategy that the pragmatists pursue as well. According to this way of setting out their account, concern for what 'works' or is satisfactory is only the final move in an innovative rethinking of the nature of truth and belief. The early moves are worthy of attention, even though the final one does not in the end prove satisfactory. The essential point of a theory such as James's is to treat calling something true as doing something more like praising it than like describing it.[10]

Five separable theses can be distinguished in the elaboration of this approach. First is the performative, antidescriptive strategy, emphasizing the *act* of calling something true rather than the descriptive content one thereby associates with what is called true. Next is an account of that act as the personal taking up of a certain sort of normative stance or attitude. Taking some claim to be true is endorsing it or committing oneself to it. Third is a particular understanding of that stance or attitude. Endorsing a claim is understood as adopting it as a guide to action, where this in turn is understood in terms of the role the endorsed claim plays in practical inference, both in first-person deliberation and in third-person appraisal. Fourth, and least important, is the view that an advantage of understanding the appropriateness or correctness of adopting an attitude of endorsement in terms of its role in guiding action consists in the possibility for some sort of not merely subjective measure of that appropriateness, namely, the success of the actions it leads to. This is the only strand of the argument acknowledged or embraced by stereotypical pragmatism.

Finally and, it will be argued, most significantly, the theory claims that once one has understood acts of *taking-true* according to this four-part model, one has understood all there is to understand about truth. Truth is treated, not as a property independent of our attitudes, to which they must eventually answer, but rather as a creature of taking-true and treating-as-true. The central theoretical focus is on what one is *doing* when one takes something to be true—that is, our use of 'true', the acts and practices of taking things to be true that collectively constitute the use we make of this expression. It is then denied that there is more to the phenomenon of truth than the proprieties of such takings. Theories of this general sort may be called 'phenomenalist', in recognition of the analogy with the paradigmatic subjective phenomenalism concerning physical objects, whose slogan was "esse est percipi." The significance of such a move in the context of the present approach should be obvious, for taking-true is just asserting or judging. The classical pragmatist line of thought accordingly holds out the possibility of understanding the use of 'true' in terms of what we are doing when we make a claim, putting forward a sentence *as* true.

According to this decomposition of their view into five theory-features, the pragmatists start with the idea that in calling something true, one is *doing* something, rather than, or in addition to, *saying* something. Instead of asking what property it is that we are describing a belief or claim as having

when we say that it is true, they ask about the *practical significance* of the *act* we are performing in attributing that property. We accomplish many things by talking, and not all of them are happily assimilated to describing how things are. One ought not to conclude that because truth ascriptions are expressed in the same subject-predicate grammar that descriptions are, they must for that reason be understood to function as descriptions do. The pragmatic approach, centering on the act of calling something true rather than the content one thereby characterizes it as displaying, has much to recommend it. It has been seized upon by a number of authors who would not go on to accept the account of the act in question that the pragmatists offer. For, stripped of those further commitments, the recommendation is for a *performative* analysis of truth talk. In Fregean terms it is the suggestion that 'true' is a force-indicating, rather than a sense-expressing, locution.

Wittgenstein notoriously warned against thoughtless assimilation of sentence use to fact-stating, and of term use to referring. In the wake of Austin's discussions, theorists such as Strawson offered accounts of 'true' as a performative.[11] Its use was to be assimilated to other sorts of commitment-undertaking, in a way parallel to that expressed by the explicit performative 'I promise . . .' In the same spirit, other contemporary accounts were offered of 'good' as expressing a kind of commendation, as taking up an attitude or expressing one's own relation to something, rather than as describing it by attributing some objective property. This is the sort of assimilation James had been urging in saying that truth is "what is good in the way of belief." Such remarks are often misinterpreted as claiming descriptive equivalence, or coextensiveness of the predicates 'true' and 'what it is good for us to believe'. On such a reading, the allegedly uncontroversial claim "It is good for us to believe the truth,"—that is, the truth is among the things it is good for us to believe—is turned on its head. Necessary conditions are treated as sufficient, and truth is defined as whatever it is good for us to believe. James intent was rather to mark off 'true', like 'good', as a term whose use involves the taking up of a nondescriptive stance, the undertaking of a commitment that has eventual significance for action. In the vocabulary of this work, it is adopting an implicitly normative practical attitude.

What motivates such a performative analysis, for the pragmatists no less than for later theorists, is the special relation that obtains between the force or practical significance of an act of taking-true (which one might, before the performative possibility has been broached, uncritically have called an act of 'describing as' true) and the force or significance of a straightforward assertion. In asserting "It is true that p," one asserts that p, and vice versa. The force or significance of the two claims is the same. On the face of it, this redundancy or transparency of force, the fact that adding the operator 'It is true that . . .' to what one is going to assert does not change the force or significance of that assertion, might be explained in either of two different ways. One might take it that the content that is expressed in a truth ascrip-

tion is special, and that the redundancy of force of truth claims arises out of features of the property a claim or belief is said to exhibit when it is described as true. One must then go on to offer an account of why attributing that property has the consequences that it does for the force of one's attribution. This can be compared to treating claims using 'good' or 'ought' as describing properties of actions, and then needing a theory explaining the special motivational role that attributions of these properties must be taken to have for the attributor. The pragmatic theories being considered adopt the more direct path of taking the transmitted force of truth claims as the central phenomenon, one that is merely obscured by the misleading grammar of property ascription.

Dewey's assertibilist theory of truth develops these ideas along explicitly performative lines using the model of utterances of 'I claim (or assert) that *p*'.[12] The claim that the force of freestanding utterances of this type and of 'It is true that *p*' are equivalent is especially liable to misinterpretation as the claim that the contents expressed by these utterances are the same. As will be seen below, it is easy to show that that is not so. In any case, as a revisionist, Dewey did not even claim equivalence of force, though that was the dimension along which he assessed the relationship between his views and the tradition. He has accordingly often been 'refuted' on the basis of misunderstandings of theories that he did not subscribe to in the first place.

To this performative, antidescriptive explanatory commitment, the pragmatists add a particular sort of account of the act of taking-true as adopting a *normative stance* toward the claim or belief. In treating something as true, one is praising it in a special way—endorsing it or committing oneself to it. The stance is normative in involving what the claim to which one has taken up a truth-attitude is good for or *appropriately* used for. For treating something as the truth is plighting one's troth to it, not just acknowledging that it has some property. Truth undertakings are taken to be personal in that the proprieties of conduct one thereby commits oneself to depend on one's other commitments, commitments to choose (representing preference, desire, interest, need, and so on) as well as commitments to say (assert and believe). One is expressing or establishing one's own relation to a claim, in taking it to be true, rather than recognizing some independent property that claim already had. Again the model of promising is important. This important emphasis on the normative character of cognitive undertakings was their acknowledgment of the central Kantian legacy that has been rejuvenated for us by Wittgenstein. Its expression is often obscured (Peirce is, as so often, an exception) by the pragmatists' further commitment to the sort of naturalism about the norms involved that gives rise to the attribution to them of stereotypical pragmatism.

Their understanding of the sort of commitment undertaken in taking-true is as a commitment to rely on the belief or claim in question in guiding practical activity. This in turn is understood as a commitment to using the

claim as a premise in practical inferences, whose conclusions are not further claims but actions—that is, performances under a description that is privileged by its relation to deliberation and appraisal. Relative to the truth-taking commitment, one ought to reason practically in one way rather than another. The proprieties of practical inference concerning whether to bring an umbrella are different for one who takes-true the claim that it is raining than for one who does not. The force of such proprieties is normative in that, although they may be ignored, the significance or force of the agent's commitment is to the effect that they *ought* not to be. It is these prudential 'ought's that appraisal of actions assesses.

Thus the stance or attitude that one adopts in treating something as true is to be understood by its role in orienting action when activated by a contextualized attempt to satisfy the desires, preferences, and so forth that one finds oneself with. The discussion of action in the previous chapter indicates that such a naturalistic, instrumental picture of the 'ought's involved in action and belief is not the only candidate. But the fact that the classical pragmatists go on to offer a naturalistic account of norms along these lines should not distract attention from their appreciation that the phenomenon of taking-true they address concerns *normative attitudes*, and that attributing truth is for them attributing a *normative status*.

Pragmatism in the stereotypical sense arises when one conjoins the ideas of a performative analysis of taking-true, of the relevant kind of performance as undertaking a personal commitment, and of the commitment as specifying the appropriate role of a claim in action-orienting deliberation, with the further idea that the measure of the correctness of the stance undertaken by a truth-attributor is the success of the actions it guides. Although the point will not be pursued here, it may be noted in passing that it is not easy to say what relation to the success of individual actions some substantive property of beliefs ought to stand in for it to play the sort of explanatory role that classical pragmatism envisions. It is by no means the case that for each belief in each deliberation, an agent is more likely to succeed in accomplishing the desired result if that belief is true than if it is false. The success of a plan can be thwarted by collateral false beliefs, and in the context of such beliefs, it may actually be helpful to have a further, compensating false belief. Someone who desires to cross a ravine and has formed the plan of felling a tree if one tall enough can be found near the edge will be more likely to succeed if equipped with the false belief, of the only likely candidate tree, that it is more than forty feet tall, than with the true belief that it is only thirty feet tall, in the case where that individual also believes falsely of the twenty-five-foot-wide ravine that it is forty feet across. Although the possibility of this sort of case is no reason to prefer in general to act on false beliefs, it does show that success is associated with a property of *sets* of beliefs, rather than individual beliefs. Where this point is acknowledged, the desired pragmatist principle is often formulated as the claim that "if all our beliefs were true, then the actions we undertook on those beliefs would satisfy our desires."[13]

But even this does not seem right. To ensure success, it would be necessary to ban not only error but ignorance, for facts of which the agent is unaware can lead to failure, even if all the agent's beliefs are correct. Of course this will not be true if those beliefs include one to the effect that there are no circumstances of which the agent is unaware that would thwart the plan being adopted. But including such beliefs threatens the principle with triviality in the same way that including among the beliefs stipulated to be true the belief that the plan will succeed would threaten it. So it is not clear how the vague pragmatist pronouncement that "the truth is what works" can be made more precise, without either falsifying or trivializing it. Fortunately, for the purposes of this chapter it is not necessary to resolve this issue.

3. *Phenomenalism*

Nonetheless, pragmatism is normally identified with the claim that the measure of the correctness of the stance undertaken by a truth-attributor is the success of the actions it guides. But the explanatory role played by this most notorious of the pragmatists' tenets ought to be understood in the light of the larger strategy for relating the concepts of truth and belief that it subserves. From a methodological point of view, perhaps the most interesting feature of the pragmatic approach is its commitment to phenomenalism about truth.[14] Only in the context of a phenomenalist explanatory strategy can commitments of the first three sorts be seen as illuminating the notion of truth. For what they really supply is a theory of *taking*-true. It is in the overarching commitment to the effect that once one understands what it is to take or treat something as true, one will have understood as well the concept of truth that the phenomenalism of this strategy consists.

The force-redundancy approach to truth emphasizes the practical equivalence of taking something to be true and believing it, so another way of putting the point is the following: instead of starting with a metaphysical account of truth, such as that of the correspondence theorists, in opposition to which the pragmatists defined themselves, and employing that in one's account of beliefs, which are then conceived as representations that could be true, that is, have the property previously defined, the pragmatists go the other way around. They offer an account of believing or taking-true, characterized by the three sorts of commitments already canvassed, that does not appeal to any notion of truth. Being true is then to be understood as being *properly* taken-true (believed). It is this idea that is built on here, jettisoning the details of the classical pragmatist account of belief or taking-true, and substituting for it the account of assertion and doxastic discursive commitment introduced in Chapter 3.

From this point of view, what is of most interest about the classical pragmatist stories is not stereotypical pragmatism but the dual commitment to a *normative* account of claiming or believing that does not lean on a supposedly explanatory antecedent notion of truth, and the suggestion that

truth can then be understood phenomenalistically, in terms of features of these independently characterized *takings*-true. The sort of explanatory strategies here called 'phenomenalist' in a broad sense treat the subject matter about which one adopts a phenomenalistic view as *supervening* on something else, in a way whose paradigm is provided by classical sensationalist phenomenalism about physical objects. The slogan of this narrower class of paradigmatically phenomenalist views is, "To be is to be perceived." The characteristic shift of explanatory attention enforced by these approaches is from what is represented to representings of it. The representeds are explained in terms of the representings, instead of the other way around. Talk ostensibly about objects and their objective properties is understood as a code for talk about representings that are interrelated in complicated but regular ways. What the naive conservatism implicit in unreflective practice understands as objects and properties independent of our perceptual takings of them now becomes radically and explicitly construed as structures of or constructions out of those takings. Attributed existence, independence, and exhibition of properties are all to be seen as features of attributings of them.

The general structure exhibited by this sort of account is that the facts about *having* physical properties are taken to supervene on the facts about *seeming* to have such properties. Or in the vocabulary to be preferred here, the facts about what things *are* Ks, for a specified sortal *K*, supervene on the facts about what things are *taken* to be Ks. According to such an explanatory strategy, one must offer first an independent account of the takings—one that does not appeal in any way to what it is to be a *K* in order to explain what it is to take something to be one. Thus classical phenomenalism concerning physical properties such as *red* found itself obliged to account for states of the attributing subject in which things *look-red* or *seem-red* without invoking the redness that is attributed in such takings. Once that obligation is satisfied, it can further be claimed that there are no facts about what things are red, or what it is for things to be red, over and above all the (possible) facts about what things look or seem red.

Classical subjective phenomenalism regarding physical objects and properties notoriously failed in both of these component explanatory tasks. Cartesian mental acts seemed ideal candidates for the takings in question. This ontological category had been given an epistemic definition in terms of the privileged access (in the sense of transparency and incorrigibility) subjects have to the class of takings that includes perceptual seemings. That something could not *seem* red to a subject who did not by virtue of that very taking *know* that it seemed red, and that something could not merely *seem* to seem red without *really* seeming red, made this class of takings appear well suited to provide the independently characterized base of a supervenience relation. Their special epistemic status seemed to guarantee for these subjective takings or attributings the possibility of a characterization independent of what they take or attribute. For one knows all about these states

just by having or being in them, apart from any relation to anything but the knowing subject and the known mental state.

4. *'Looks' Talk and the Errors of Subjective Phenomenalism*

But this way of understanding 'looks' is a mistake. As various authors have shown (the locus classicus is Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"), 'looks'-talk does not form an autonomous stratum of language: a game one could play, though one played no other. When one understands properly how the 'seems' operator functions, one sees that the incorrigibility of such claims essentially arises from their *withholding* of the endorsements involved in unqualified claims about how things actually are. As was indicated already in Chapter 4, noninferential reporting practices involve two distinguishable components: a reliable differential responsive disposition and the capacity to exercise that disposition by *endorsing* a claim. It is this second component that puts the response into the inferentially articulated space of applications of *concepts*, by bringing it into the game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars's account of 'looks' or 'seems' is that these locutions are introduced *after* such a practice is under way, as a way of dealing with systematic sources of perceptual error that one becomes aware of through having to withdraw unreflective noninferential claims on the basis of their incompatibility with commitments one is otherwise entitled to (noninferentially, inferentially, or by testimony). One can then *express* the responsive disposition to call something red—a disposition to endorse a claim (undertake a doxastic commitment) *if* one did not know better (have reason to think that commitment is liable to be flawed)—without actually endorsing the claim one is acknowledging a certain temptation to endorse. This is how one begins to become reflective about the implicit appropriate circumstances of reporting. Thus in saying how things *look*, one is withholding an endorsement and so is naturally incorrigible.

In arguing for this diagnosis, Sellars points to two sorts of uses of 'seems' or 'looks' that it makes sense of and that are unintelligible if one construes them as minimal, incorrigible-because-unconceptualized reports on immediate experience. One is *generic* looks claims: the hen looks to have a number of spots, but there is no particular number of spots she looks to have; the polygon looks many-sided, but it does not look to be 998-sided, and does not look to be 999-sided, and so on. For Sellars, these cases are matters of what commitment one is prepared to endorse and defend. One can be willing to endorse the claim that an object is red without being willing to go further and endorse the claim that it is scarlet—and similarly for all the other shades of red. One withholds endorsement from the more specific claim, while endorsing the generic one. On traditional accounts, one must either jettison the transparency and incorrigibility of our knowledge of our own experiences or sense data or else treat these things as unlike ordinary objects in some-

times being *merely* generic. Such strenuous metaphysical exertions are obviated by Sellars's analysis.

The other use he points to is the difference between:

> It looks as though there is a tree over there.
> There is something that looks to be a tree over there.
> There is a tree over there.

The different scope of the 'looks' operator corresponds to the different scope of the commitments undertaken and withheld. In the first case, one endorses nothing about the claim, merely evincing the noninferential disposition to apply concepts one in the event refuses to apply. In the second case, one endorses the existence of something over there and evinces one's temptation to call it a tree, while resisting that temptation and not endorsing that characterization. In the third case, one endorses the whole claim. One is 'incorrigible' exactly as far as one withholds endorsement. But of course one cannot withhold endorsement unless one can grant it, and to do that one must be in the game of making ordinary corrigible noninferential reports. The very incorrigibility that recommended 'seems' statements as a basis in terms of which everything epistemically less certain could be understood turns out to be an expression of the parasitic relation that these withholdings of endorsement have to the risky practices of endorsement from which they derive their meaning, by contrast to which they exhibit their special status. Whatever may be their role in the order of *justification*, in the order of *understanding* 'seems-red' presupposes 'is-red'.

It may be noted in passing that Sellars's analysis applies to first-person uses of 'looks' (or more generally 'seems'). His endorsement-withholding diagnosis is confirmed by consideration of third-person, or attributing, uses. For in that case an ambiguity arises: the claim "It (merely) seems to *S* that *p*" may be used either to attribute *S*'s withholding of an endorsement (the state *S* would express in propria persona by uttering "It seems to me that *p*") or to attribute the undertaking of a commitment to *S* (the state *S* would express by claiming that *p*) while expressing the *attributor's* withholding of endorsement of the claim that *p*. In this sense, 'seems' is used to express a hybrid deontic state dual to that expressed by 'true': the first corresponds to "*S incorrectly* believes that *p*," and the second to "*S correctly* believes that *p*"—in the sense of 'correct' that has to do with commitment, rather than entitlement.

Although Sellars does not say so, an entirely parallel analysis applies on the side of noninferential practical discursive *exits*. Just as a doxastic commitment whose success one is not prepared to endorse can be denominated a mere *seeming*, so a practical commitment whose success one is not prepared to endorse can be denominated a *trying*. Just as while it can seem to one that something is red without its actually being red, but it cannot merely seem to one that it seems to one to be red without its actually seeming so,

so while one can try to lift the weight without actually lifting it, one cannot merely try to try to lift it, without actually trying to do so. Neither seemings nor tryings iterate nontrivially. Just as the first point can be put (with substantial danger of misleading in a Cartesian direction) by saying that the distinction between appearance and reality does not apply to appearances, so the second can be put (subject to the same danger) by saying that the distinction between willing and succeeding does not apply to willings. The danger is that one will be tempted to think of seemings as cognitions about which one cannot be in error, and of tryings as actions one cannot fail to accomplish. The mind can then be thought of as consisting in these two sorts of representings that cannot fall short of what is represented (which in turn can be understood only by the coincidence in this case of representing and represented): states such that just by having them one counts on the one hand as knowing something and on the other as doing something. On this rendering, the mind extends just as far as its total cognitive and practical dominion; its limits are scribed by the inapplicability of the concepts of error and failure.

The cost of treating these degenerate cases as representational paradigms is to render unintelligible in the ordinary fallible cases the relation between doxastic or practical representings and the represented states of affairs known or brought about by them. These temptations are best avoided by correctly diagnosing the source of the noniterability of the 'seems' or 'tries' operator, which is the phenomenon that originally motivates this disastrous metaphysics of the mental. For then grasp of what is expressed by both 'seems' and 'tries' talk is seen to depend on grasp of what is expressed in ordinary fallible 'is' talk; one cannot withhold endorsements one cannot undertake or attribute, and a further disavowal of an endorsement once disavowed is without effect. So understood, neither the cognitive infallibility of seemings nor the practical infallibility of tryings is eligible to serve a foundational role. A subject conceived as contracted to these activities alone cannot be coherently thought of as grasping or accomplishing anything, hence not as a subject at all.

Because in the order of understanding, grasp of what is expressed by concepts of the form 'seems-*K*' presupposes grasp of what is expressed by corresponding concepts of the form 'is-*K*', the classical phenomenalist basis of takings as subjectively certified seemings cannot be secured with the autonomy from the properties taken to be exhibited that is requisite for the subsequent framing of phenomenalist supervenience explanations. Those explanations have troubles, however, apart from those regarding their basis. Generic phenomenalism has been characterized here in terms of supervenience. The sense intended is that one vocabulary supervenes on another just in case there could not be two situations in which true claims (that is, facts) formulable in the supervening vocabulary differed, while the true claims formulable in the vocabulary supervened on do not differ. More neutrally (but in the end equivalently) put, once it is settled what one is committed to as

expressed in the one vocabulary, then it is settled what one is committed to as expressed in the other.

Classical subjective phenomenalism about physical objects and properties typically makes stronger, reductionist claims, involving further commitments beyond supervenience. These regard the equivalence of sentences (or in the most committive cases, individual terms and predicates) in physical object talk to sentences (or terms and predicates) constructible in the language of takings-as-seemings. Again, the sort of equivalence in question might vary from the extreme of definitional or translational equivalence down to mere coextensiveness. In none of these forms are phenomenalist claims of this reductionist variety plausible today (as Quine argues in "Epistemology Naturalized").[15] Attempts to work out these reductive phenomenalist strategies have shown that the conditions under which there are reliable connections between how things seem perceptually and how they are can themselves be stated only in terms of how things are. The inference from things seeming red to their being red depends on there being *in fact* no filters, strange lights, retina-altering drugs, and so on. That there not *seem* to be such is far from sufficient.[16]

These explanatory failures of phenomenalism in the narrow sense ought not to be taken to impugn the prospects of phenomenalist strategies in the broad sense. For those difficulties arise from the way its general phenomenalist commitments are specialized: in applying to perceivable physical properties, in offering an account of the relevant sort of takings as incorrigible subjective perceptual seemings, and in insisting on reduction rather than just supervenience as the relation between them. Phenomenalism in general is a structure that antirealist accounts of many different subject matters may exhibit. It elaborates one way of taking seriously what Dummett calls the issue of "recognition transcendence." To detail a specific version of this sort, one must specify three things: what it is that one is taking a phenomenalist approach to (for example, physical objects, mental activity, semantic properties, the past, and so forth), how one conceives the takings or attributings on which talk of such things is taken to supervene, and how in particular the supervenience relation is conceived. Corresponding to each specific phenomenalist claim of this sort will be a class of claims that qualify as *realist* in the sense of denying the phenomenalist's "nothing but" account of the subject matter in question. For the classical pragmatist the facts about what is true supervene on the facts about taking-true, that is, on the actual action-guiding roles of beliefs. In order to appreciate the significance of the pragmatists' phenomenalist strategy, one must first consider the development of the basic idea that truth locutions are force-indicating, rather than content-specifying. The subsequent trajectory of this idea will be reconstructed, before returning to the issue of phenomenalism about truth. In the end, the phenomenalism of the classical pragmatists about truth will appear as a special case of the way in which normative statuses have been taken to be instituted by

normative attitudes, so that talk of commitments can be traded in for talk of undertaking and attributing commitments.

Before going on to see what is wrong with pragmatic phenomenalism about truth, it is worthwhile to recall briefly what can make it attractive. The account of knowledge claims offered in Chapter 3 depends on this approach. It can now be seen that that account should be seen as propounding a certain kind of phenomenalism about knowledge, which depends on a corresponding phenomenalism about truth. Its primary focus is not on knowledge itself but on *attributions* of knowledge, attitudes toward that status. The pragmatist must ask, What are we *doing* when we say that someone knows something? According to a phenomenalist reconstruction of the classic justified-true-belief account of knowledge (developed above in 4.1.2), in taking someone to know something, one first of all *attributes* a *commitment*, that is, takes someone to believe. One further *attributes entitlement* to that commitment, that is, takes the committed subject to be justified.

What, then, is the function of the truth condition on knowledge? Conventionally, treating taking the claim that the subject is committed to as true is understood as attributing some property to it, characterizing it or describing it. But it has already been pointed out that the pragmatist's account of taking the claim to be true is as *acknowledging* or *undertaking* a commitment to it. The truth condition does not qualify the entitled commitment that is attributed but simply indicates that the attributor of knowledge must endorse it. This is a deontic attitude that differs in its *social* perspective. Attributions of knowledge have the central linguistic status that they do because in them commitment to a claim is *both* attributed and undertaken. This phenomenalist distinction of social perspective, between the act of attributing and the act of undertaking a commitment, is what is *mis*taken for the attribution of a descriptive property (for which an otiose metaphysics then appears to be required).

A pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge will accordingly investigate the social and normative significance of acts of attributing knowledge. The account of taking-true being considered is what makes possible such a way of thinking about knowledge claims. The account of asserting introduced in Chapter 3 can be extended to such an account of knowledge, via the notion of knowledge *claims*, only if something can be made of the phenomenalist strategy of classical pragmatism about truth. There are some serious obstacles, however, to pursuing this strategy.

5. *Embedded Uses of 'True' and the Failure of the Pragmatists' Analysis*

On the pragmatic line being considered, it is the practical significance or force of asserting that defines taking-true, and this sense of

taking-true accounts for our use of 'true'. In spite of all that there is to recommend such a hypothesis, this conjunctive thesis cannot be correct as it stands. A familiar point of Frege's shows the inadequacy of the basic pragmatic claim. Truth talk cannot be given a purely pragmatic rendering because not all uses of '. . . is true' have assertoric or judgmental force. The force-based approach can at most account for a subset of our uses of truth locutions. Frege drew attention to the use of sentences as components of other sentences. Assertion of a sentence containing another sentence as a component is not in general assertion of the embedded sentence. That is, the embedded sentence does not occur with assertional force, does not express something the assertor of the containing sentence is thereby committed to.

As the antecedent of a conditional, 'It is true that *p*,' for instance, cannot have the significance of a taking-true if that is understood as the expressing of assertional force. In this sense one does not take-true the claim that *p* in asserting, 'If it is true that *p*, then it is true that *q*'. Of course this is just the point that was urged in Chapter 3 against traditional accounts that identify assertion as a kind of predication or representation. In those cases as in this one, the embedded uses show that what is at issue has to do with the content expressed, rather than the force attached to the speech act in which that content is expressed.

The pragmatic approach, then, offers an account only of the freestanding uses of sentences formed with '. . . is true', not the embedded ones. This is the same rock on which, as Geach has shown,[17] performative accounts of the use of 'good' have foundered. It is precisely because one cannot embed, say, questions and imperatives as antecedents of well-formed conditionals (in which they would occur without their characteristic force) that their significance as askings and commandings is associated with their force—and so is not to be understood as a feature of the descriptive content they express. If the essence of calling something good consisted in doing something rather than saying something, then it should not be possible to say things like, "If that is good, then one ought to do it." That one can sensibly say things like this shows that 'good' has descriptive content that survives the stripping away by embedding of the force associated with freestanding describings.

So an embedding test can be treated as criterial for broadly descriptive occurrences of expressions. According to this test, 'It is true that *p*' has nonperformative uses that the pragmatists' approach does not account for. And it is not open to the pragmatist simply to distinguish two senses of truth claims, one freestanding and the other embedded, and proceed from ambiguity. For on such a line one would be equivocating in inferring from the freestanding 'It is true that *p*' and the conditional 'If it is true that *p*, then it is true that *q*', in which it occurs embedded, that it is true that *q*, by detachment. So the pragmatic theory must be rejected and the phenomena it points to otherwise explained.

This sort of objection surfaces in many forms. Those who incorrectly take

Dewey to have offered an analysis of 'true', rather than a candidate replacement notion, must thereby treat his assertibilism as the assertion of an equivalence of content between the sentences 'It is true that *p*' and the explicit performative 'I (hereby) claim that *p*'. The most such a made-up thinker would be entitled to claim is that the force of the freestanding utterance of these sentences is the same. The stronger theory is refuted by noticing that 'It is true that *p*' and 'I claim that *p*' behave differently as embedded components. For instance, they are not intersubstitutable as the antecedents of conditionals, saving the inferential role of the resulting compound.

So an account such as is often attributed to Dewey is subject (as Putnam has pointed out in different terms)[18] to a version of Moore's naturalistic fallacy argument. Not everyone who is committed to the conditional 'If it is true that *p*, then it is true that *p*' is committed also to the conditional 'If I claim that *p*, then it is true that *p*'. If we like, we can put this point by saying that there is nothing self-contradictory about the claim 'It is possible that I claim that *p*, and it is not true that *p*'.[19] The naturalistic fallacy point is thus just another way of putting the objection from embedding.

III. FROM PRAGMATISM TO PROSENTENCES

1. *Redundancy*

Pointing to the sentential embedded uses of '. . . is true' shows the inadequacy of the pragmatists' attempt to make do with a notion of taking-true as asserting. Analyzing and identifying uses of truth locutions by means of *redundancy of force* (that is, by a formal property of the pragmatic significance of acts of asserting freestanding truth claims) is not a sufficient explanatory strategy. It is not that freestanding force redundancy is not a central phenomenon of truth talk. But not all uses of truth locutions take this form. More is required for an account of the use of 'true' than can be provided simply by an account of taking-true as asserting or undertaking an assertional commitment. The pragmatic account cannot for this reason be the whole truth.

Rather than simply discarding that approach, it is possible to amend it so as to retain the pragmatic account for the freestanding uses to which it properly applies. For there is a more general redundancy view that has the force redundancy of freestanding truth-takings as a consequence. Embedded uses can be explained by a notion of *redundancy of content* according to which (apart from niceties having to do with type/token ambiguities) even in embedded contexts 'It is true that *p*' is equivalent to *p*. For even their embedded occurrences are equivalent as antecedents of conditionals, in the sense that anyone who is committed to 'If it is true that *p*, then *q*' is thereby committed to 'If *p* then *q*' and vice versa. Furthermore, intersubstitutability

of 'it is true that *p*' and *p* in *all* occurrences, embedded or not, is sufficient to yield force redundancy in freestanding uses as a consequence. If two asserted contents are the same, then the significance of asserting them in the same pragmatic context should be the same. On such a content redundancy view, the pragmatists have simply mistaken a part for a whole.

Redundancy views such as Ramsey's accordingly provide a generalization of the pragmatist's point, one that permits an answer to the otherwise decisive refutation offered by the embedding objection. Accounts that generalize to the intersubstitutability of 'Snow is white' and 'It is true that snow is white' are clearly on the right track. They show what is needed to supplement the pragmatists' account in order to deal with some embedded occurrences. But they do not yet account for all the contexts in which the taking-true locution '. . . is true' occurs. Such simple redundancy accounts will not offer a correct reading of sentences like 'Goldbach's conjecture is true'. For this sentence is not interchangeable with 'Goldbach's conjecture'. For instance, the former, but not the latter, appears as the antecedent of well-formed and significant conditionals. So content redundancy, while relaxing the limitations constraining the original pragmatic account, will not apply correctly in all the contexts in which truth locutions occur.

2. *Disquotation*

Such cases show that the content redundancy view must in turn be revised to include the operation of some sort of disquotation or unnominalizing operator. In the cases to which the simple content redundancy theory applies, the additional operation will be transparent. But in the case of sentences such as 'Goldbach's conjecture is true', the claim with respect to which the truth-taking is content redundant must be determined by a two-stage process. First, a sentence nominalization is discerned. This may be a description such as 'Goldbach's conjecture', a quote-name such as 'Snow is white', a 'that'-clause sortal such as 'the claim that snow is white', or other sort of nominalization. Next, a sentence is produced that is nominalized by the locution picked out in the first stage. This is a sentence expressing Goldbach's conjecture, named by the quote-name, one which says *that* snow is white, and so on. It is this sentence that is then treated by theory as intersubstitutable with the truth-attributing sentence, whether occurring embedded or freestanding.

A content redundancy account with disquotation or unnominalization is more satisfactory and deals with more cases than a simple content redundancy account does—just as content redundancy accounts represent improvements of theories acknowledging only redundancy of force. But even disquotational views will not account for all the uses of '. . . is true' that might be important. They will not deal correctly, for instance, with occurrences such as 'Everything the policeman said is true', in which a *quantified*

sentence nominalization is employed. For here what is nominalized is a whole *set* of sentences, and there need in general be no single sentence that is equivalent to all of them. A further refinement of content redundancy accounts is required if they are to be able to deal with this range of cases.

3. *Anaphora and Prosentences*

The most sophisticated version of the redundancy theory, one capable of handling quantificational truth idioms, is the remarkable anaphoric analysis undertaken by Grover, Camp, and Belnap in their essay "A Prosentential Theory of Truth."[20] For the original redundancy and disquotational theories, each use of '. . . is true' is associated with some sentence on which it is redundant or with which it shares its content. Whatever else this may mean, it at least includes a commitment that the intersubstitution of the sentence containing 'true' and its nonsemantic equivalent, in some privileged range of contexts, preserves assertional and inferential commitments.

The difficulty in extending this intersubstitutional account to the quantificational case is that there the use of the sentence containing 'true' is determined not by a single sentence but by a whole *set* of sentences, those expressing whatever the policeman has said. Of course disquotation or unnominalization may produce sets of sentences as well, as more than one sentence may express Goldbach's conjecture. But in such cases the sentences must all share a content or be redundant on each other—that is, must be intersubstitutable with each other in the relevant contexts—whereas there is no requirement that any two sentences that express things the policeman has said be in any other way equivalent. So what is it that the sentence containing 'true' shares its content with, or is redundant upon in the sense of intersubstitutability? What is distinctive of the anaphoric development of redundancy theories is its use of the model of *pronouns* to show how, in spite of this difficulty, the quantificational cases can be treated both as redundant in the same way nonquantificational cases are and as deriving their content from a whole *set* of nonintersubstitutable sentences.

It has been noticed that pronouns serve two sorts of purposes.[21] In the *lazy* use, as in 'If Mary wants to arrive on time, she should leave now', they are replaceable by their antecedents, merely avoiding repetition. In the *quantificational* use of pronouns, as in 'Any positive integer is such that if it is even, adding it to one yields an odd number', such replacement clearly would change the sense. 'If any positive number is even, adding any positive number to one yields an odd number' is not a consequence one becomes committed to by undertaking the original claim. In such cases, the semantic role of the pronoun is determined by a set of admissible substituends, which is in turn fixed by the grammatical antecedent (here 'any positive number'). Asserting the original sentence commits one to each of the results of replacing the

pronoun 'it' in some occurrence by some admissible substituend, that is, some expression that refers to a positive number.[22]

The prosentential theory of truth is what results if one decides to treat '. . . is true' as a syncategorematic fragment of pro*sentences* and then understands this new category by semantic analogy to other proforms, in particular to pronouns functioning as just described. So 'Snow is white is true' is read as a prosentence of laziness, having the same semantic content as its anaphoric antecedent, perhaps the token of 'Snow is white' that it contains. The prosentence differs from its antecedent in explicitly acknowledging its dependence upon an antecedent—as 'She stopped' differs from 'Mary stopped' when the pronoun has some token of the type 'Mary' as its antecedent. Otherwise, the lazy uses are purely redundant.[23] The advance on earlier conceptions lies in the availability on this model of *quantificational* uses of prosentences containing 'true'. 'Everything the policeman said is true' is construed as containing a quantificational prosentence, which picks up from its anaphoric antecedent a set of admissible substituends (things the policeman said). Expanding the claim in the usual way, to 'For anything one can say, if the policeman said it, then it is true', explicitly exhibits 'it is true' as the quantificationally dependent prosentence. Each quantificational instance of this quantificational claim can be understood in terms of the lazy functioning of prosentences, and the quantificational claim is related to those instances in the usual conjunctive way.

By analogy to pronouns, prosentences are defined by four conditions[24]:

1. They occupy all grammatical positions that can be occupied by declarative sentences, whether freestanding or embedded.
2. They are generic, in that *any* declarative sentence can be the antecedent of some prosentence.[25]
3. They can be used anaphorically either in the lazy way or in the quantificational way.
4. In each use, a prosentence will have an anaphoric antecedent that determines a class of admissible sentential substituends for the prosentence (in the lazy case, a singleton). This class of substituends determines the significance of the prosentence associated with it.

There are many philosophical virtues to explicating each occurrence of 'true' as marking the use of a prosentence in this sense. Quite varied uses, including embedded ones, of expressions involving 'true' in English are accounted for by means of a unified model. That model is in turn explicated by appeal to the familiar and closely analogous pronominal anaphoric reference relation. Not only is the semantics of such uses explained, but their pragmatic features are as well—namely, acknowledgment of an antecedent and the use of truth locutions to endorse or adopt someone else's claim. Tarski's biconditionals are appropriately underwritten, so the necessary condition of adequacy for theories of truth that he establishes is satisfied.

A feature dear to the hearts of the prosententialists is the metaphysical

parsimony of the theory. For what in the past were explained as attributions of a special and mysterious *property* (truth) to equally mysterious bearers of truth (propositions) are exhibited instead as uses of grammatical proforms anaphorically referring only to the sentence tokenings that are their antecedents. A further virtue of the prosentential account is that anaphora is a relation between *tokenings*. Consequently the use of tokenings of types such as 'That is true' as a response to a tokening of 'I am hungry' is construed correctly—just as 'he' can have 'I' as its antecedent without thereby referring to whoever uttered 'he'. An incautiously stated content redundancy theory would get these indexical cases wrong. Finally, the uses of 'true' falling under the elegant, anaphorically unified treatment include quantificational ones such as 'Everything the oracle says is true', which are recalcitrant to more primitive redundancy and disquotational approaches.

The classical pragmatists' insistence that in calling something true, one is not describing it is respected. For one does not describe a cat when one refers to it pronominally by means of an 'it'. This point is further broadened to accommodate embedded uses where the account of the describing alternative as endorsing does not (as emerged above) apply. 'True' functions anaphorically and not descriptively even in such cases. And anaphoric inheritance of content explains equally why freestanding or force-bearing uses of 'It is true that *p*' have the pragmatic significance of endorsements of the claim that *p*. The prosentential account shows how the pragmatists' insights can be preserved, while accounting for the uses of 'true' that cause difficulties for their original formulation. It is accordingly a way of working out the content redundancy rescue strategy.

4. Prosentence-Forming Operators

The treatment of quantificational prosentences represents an advance over previous redundancy theories. As the theory is originally presented, however, the treatment of lazy prosentences in some ways retreats from the ground gained by disquotational developments of redundancy theories. The explanatory costs associated with the original theory arise because it treats *most* occurrences of 'true' as quantificational. Thus the official version of 'The first sentence Bismarck uttered in 1865 is true' construes it as a quantified conditional of the form 'For any sentence, if it is the first sentence Bismarck uttered in 1865, then it is true', in which 'it is true' is a prosentence of quantification.

One of the strengths of the prosentential account is its capacity to use the logical structure of quantification to explain the use of complicated sentences such as 'Something John said is either true or has been said by George'. There should be no quarrel with the author's treatment of these sentences that "wear their quantifiers on their sleeves." And it is clear that any sentence that has the surface form of a predication of truth of some sentence nominalization can be construed as a conditional propositional quantifica-

tion. But it is not clear that it is a good idea to assimilate what look like straightforward predications of truth to this quantificational model. To do so is to reject the disquotational treatment of these lazy prosentences, which has no greater ontological commitments and stays closer to the apparent form of such sentences. Otherwise almost all sentences involving 'true' must be seen as radically misleading as to their underlying logical form. The account of truth talk should bear the weight of such divergence of logical from grammatical form only if no similarly adequate account can be constructed that lacks this feature. It would be preferable to follow the treatment of sentence nominalizations suggested by disquotational generalizations of redundancy theories.

In fact there is no barrier to doing so. The original motivations of the prosentential account carry over directly to a disquotational or unnominalizing variant. According to such an account, 'The first sentence Bismarck uttered in 1865' is a sentence nominalization, a term that picks out a sentence tokening. In this case it describes the sentence, but it could be a quote-name, demonstrative, 'that'-clause sortal, or any sort of nominalization. Its function is just to pick out the antecedent on which the whole prosentence formed using 'true' is anaphorically dependent, and from which it accordingly inherits its content. Ontological commitment is just to sentence tokens and to anaphoric dependence, which prosententialists require in any case.

A brief rehearsal of the considerations leading the authors of the prosentential theory to do things otherwise will show that their reasons ought not to count against the adoption of a disquotational variant of the prosentential account. They say: "This account differs radically from the standard one since on (what we have called) the subject-predicate account 'that' in 'that is true' is always treated separately as referring by itself to some bearer of truth, whether it be a sentence, proposition, or statement. On our account cross-referencing—without separate reference of 'that'—happens between the *whole* expression 'that is true' and its antecedent."[26] Another way to put this point is that where the classical account takes a subpart of the sentence as a referring term and takes '. . . is true' as a predicate that forms a sentence from that term by characterizing its referent, according to the prosentential theory the only expression standing in a referential relation is the whole sentence, which refers anaphorically to an antecedent. There are accordingly *two* innovations put forth concerning reference in sentences like 'that is true'. The sentence is seen as an anaphoric proform and 'that' is no longer seen as a referring term. "Reference can involve either (or both) anaphoric reference or independent reference, and since people have not seriously considered the former, the possibility that *the* relation between 'that is true' and its antecedent may be that of anaphoric reference has not occurred to them. In ignoring anaphoric reference philosophers have assumed that *the* reference involved in 'that is true' is, through 'that', like that between a pronoun (say 'she' used

independently) and its referent (say Mary). Once this picture dominates, the need for bearers of truth begins to be felt, and it is then but a small step to the claim that in using 'is true' we are characterizing those entities" (emphasis added).[27]

But why should one have to choose between, on the one hand, treating the whole expression 'that is true' as a prosentence anaphorically referring to a sentence tokening from which it inherits its content and, on the other hand, treating 'that' as a referring expression (in particular a sentence nominalization) that picks out the tokening on which the whole prosentence depends? Instead of seeing '. . . is true' as a syncategorematic fragment of a semantically atomic generic prosentence 'that is true', one can see it as a *prosentence-forming operator.* It applies to a term that is a sentence nominalization or that refers to or picks out a sentence tokening. It yields a prosentence that has that tokening as its anaphoric antecedent. To take such a line is not to fall back into a subject-predicate picture, for there is all the difference in the world between a prosentence-forming operator and the predicates that form ordinary sentences. Nor does it involve commitment to bearers of truth, apart from the tokenings that play the role of sentential antecedents, which no anaphoric account can do without.

IV. REFERENCE AND ANAPHORICALLY INDIRECT DESCRIPTIONS

1. *From 'True' to 'Refers'*

There is a further reason to prefer the account that treats '. . . is true' as a prosentence-forming operator as here recommended, rather than as a fragment of the single prosentence, 'that is true' (functioning almost always quantificationally), as the original theory has it. Conceived in the former way, the treatment of 'true' has an exact parallel in the treatment of 'refers'. 'Refers' can be understood as a pronoun-forming operator. Its basic employment is in the construction of what may be called *anaphorically indirect definite descriptions.* These are expressions such as 'the one Kissinger referred to [represented, described, talked about] as "almost a third-rate intellect"', understood as a pronoun whose anaphoric antecedent is some utterance by Kissinger. A full-fledged pronominal or anaphoric theory of 'refers' talk can be generated first by showing how other uses of 'refers' and its cognates can be paraphrased so that 'refers' appears only inside indirect descriptions and then by explaining the use of these descriptions as pronouns formed by applying the 'refers' operator to some antecedent-specifying locution.[28]

Treating 'true' as an operator that applies to a sentence nominalization and produces a prosentence anaphorically dependent upon the nominalized sentence token, and 'refers' as an operator that applies to an expression picking out a term tokening and produces a pronoun anaphorically dependent

upon it then permits a single theory form to explain the use of all legitimate semantic talk about truth *and* reference in purely anaphoric terms. Discussion of how anaphoric dependence is itself to be understood must be postponed until Chapter 7, when all the raw materials will have been assembled. In what follows, then, a construction is presented that is intended to account for the use of expressions containing 'refers' and its cognates in natural languages, in a fashion strictly analogous to that just rehearsed for 'true'. To do so, however, it will be necessary to look a little more closely at the phenomenon of pronominal anaphora than was done in introducing prosentences, even though the official account of the sort of commitment inheritance that underlies that phenomenon cannot yet be considered.

Reference comes in two flavors: word-*world*, or extralinguistic reference of the sort invoked when it is said that the phrase 'the author of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*' refers to a certain actual individual (namely Kant), and word-*word* intralinguistic or anaphoric reference instanced by pronouns such as 'he' in "Wittgenstein admired Frege's work, so he traveled to Jena to talk with the great man." Intralinguistic reference of this sort has not been of much interest to philosophers (as opposed to linguists), for it has seemed natural for semantic purposes to assimilate pronouns to bound variables, and so to expect to explain anaphoric reference as grammatically guaranteed *co*reference. This coreference is in turn to be understood in terms of the primary, word-world sense of reference to the same extralinguistic item. It will be argued in Chapters 7 and 8 that this is a mistake. For one thing, anaphoric mechanisms are more fundamental than, and are presupposed by, deictic mechanisms—one cannot have a language with indexicals such as demonstratives but without expressions functioning anaphorically, though the converse is possible. For another, the explicitly representational locutions by means of which we grasp and express the distinction between what our thought and talk is *about* and what we think and say about it all depend on anaphoric mechanisms.

The point of this section is to show how an analysis in terms of anaphoric mechanisms can provide the resources for a purely *intra*linguistic account of the use of the English sentences by means of which philosophers make assertions about *extra*linguistic referential relations. More specifically, although we can and must distinguish between our words and what the words refer to or have as their referents, the truth of claims about what we are referring to by various utterances is not to be understood in terms of a *relation* of reference between expressions and the objects we use them to talk about. Following Sellars,[29] it will be argued that 'refers' not be semantically interpreted by or as a relation and, a fortiori, not a word-world relation. Instead, 'refers' will be explained as a complex anaphoric pronoun-forming operator, by analogy (in the category of terms) to the analysis of '. . . is true' offered above. To show this, the anaphoric roles that expressions can play are botanized. This leads to the specification of a new part of speech—*anaphori-*

cally indirect descriptions. Next, a formal test is offered for identifying expressions that play the anaphoric role of indirect descriptions, and 'refer' is explained as an operator that forms such descriptions. A paraphrase strategy is then offered by means of which reference claims ostensibly in other forms can be wrestled into forms in which 'refer' appears only inside indirect descriptions.

2. *Anaphoric Chains*

In his seminal article "Reference and Context," Charles Chastain suggests a novel approach to the understanding of singular term reference.[30] The basic concept he employs is that of an *anaphoric chain,* a notion best approached at this point in terms of examples. Consider the discourse:

> #A man in a brown suit approached me on the street yesterday and offered to buy my briefcase. When I declined to sell it, the man doubled his offer. Since he wanted the case so badly, I sold it to him.#

Two anaphoric chains are intertwined here, one corresponding to the buyer, and one to the briefcase:

> A man in a brown suit . . . the man . . . he . . . him

and

> my briefcase . . . it . . . the case . . . it.

The phenomenon may be indicated presystematically by saying that the reference of later elements in such chains (here 'it' and 'the man') is secured only by the relations these elements stand in to the singular terms that initiate the chains in which they appear. This is the word-word (token-token)[31] relation of *anaphoric reference* or *anaphoric dependence.* The presence of an anaphoric chain in a discourse signals that not all its singular terms have reference independently. Rather, some elements are related to their referents only in a derivative manner, in virtue of their anaphoric links to other expressions.

Examining the kinds of expressions that can initiate and continue such chains enables Chastain to make two important, related observations. The first concerns the significance of indefinite descriptions. Since Russell's discussions early in the century, indefinite descriptions have been treated as though they were not singular referring expressions at all, but rather to be understood by means of a quantificational paraphrase. The presence of an indefinite description often does signal existential quantification rather than singular reference as the proper semantic construal, but Chastain points out that the role of indefinite descriptions in anaphoric chains indicates that these expressions can also have a purely referential function. As in the

example above, an indefinite description can initiate an anaphoric chain, which may then be continued by pronouns or definite descriptions. And it seems clear that, in the context in which it occurs above, 'a man' purports to refer to a unique individual, namely the man in the brown suit who approached me on the street yesterday and eventually purchased my briefcase.[32]

This observation leads to Chastain's second point, which is that the reason that apparently nonquantificational uses of indefinite descriptions have not been thought of as straightforwardly referential is that they do not behave enough like proper names, the paradigm of singular terms. Except under deviant circumstances, if a proper name is used somewhere in a discourse invoking a particular referent, then other tokens of that same type which appear elsewhere in the discourse will be coreferential with it, in a sense that can be explained in terms of intersubstitution.[33] In

> #Leibniz has been called a pluralist, and he has been called a monist, but no one has ever thought of that philosopher as a materialist.#

the sense is not altered if all the other elements of the anaphoric chain are replaced by the initiating expression to which they anaphorically refer and on which they anaphorically depend. An inelegant redundancy is the only cost of replacing 'he' and 'that philosopher' by 'Leibniz'. In the case of an anaphoric chain initiated by an indefinite description, on the other hand, such a substitution of terms alters the sense of the sentences in which the substituted terms appear.

Consider:

> #A Republican senator threatened to filibuster the Wilderness bill. The senator's staff persuaded him that this action was unwise, so he left the chamber.#

The anaphoric chain of interest here is

> A Republican senator . . . The senator . . . him . . . he.

The sense of the discourse is completely altered if the initiating expression is substituted for each of the terms that anaphorically depends on it:

> #A Republican senator threatened to filibuster the Wilderness bill. A Republican senator's staff persuaded a Republican senator that this action was unwise, so a Republican senator left the chamber.#

In this passage the indefinite descriptions, although all of the same lexical type, do not purport to corefer. Each initiates a distinct anaphoric chain, and these chains may or may not involve the same individual. To continue such a chain requires either the use of a pronoun, which always continues an

existing chain, or the use of a definite description, which can either initiate or continue a chain. The fact that a chain beginning 'a SORTAL . . .' cannot be continued by repeating the initiating phrase, but can be continued with a definite description of the form 'the SORTAL . . .', is called by linguists the requirement of a "definitization transformation." One may conclude from such special requirements either that indefinite descriptions cannot function as singular referring expressions or that not all singular referring expressions must behave like ideal proper names. Chastain's suggestion is that the second alternative is worth exploring.

3. *Anaphoric Roles of Tokens*

Singular term tokens can play various roles in anaphoric chains. Such a token may initiate an anaphoric chain, as 'A Republican senator' does in the first example above. Or it may continue an existing chain and so depend for its referent on an anaphoric antecedent, as 'the senator' does in that example. Besides being distinguished as anaphoric initiators and dependents, tokens can be sorted according to two distinctions regarding the term types they instantiate. Chastain's considerations concerning substitution show that in dealing with anaphoric chains, one cannot in general assume that cotypical term tokens are coreferential, even in the absence of overtly indexical elements. Those expressions that (according to substitution tests such as that involved in comparing the last two examples) do not vary in reference from token to token within the type may be called *invariant under intratype or cotypical substitution.* An example would be proper names, as conceived and idealized by the tradition. Expressions that are referentially variable from token to token within the type may be described as not cotypically intersubstitutable. Pronouns would be a paradigm.[34]

The third distinction it will be useful to make is that between lexically complex expressions and those that are lexically simple, though perhaps grammatically complex—that is, between phrases that are nouns and words that are nouns. Consider, for instance, two varieties of cotypically nonintersubstitutable anaphoric dependents: dependent uses of definite descriptions and personal pronouns. The lexically simple pronoun 'he' is limited, in the information it can give about its anaphoric antecedent and the chain of which it is a part, to a small number of dimensions such as gender and number, specified in advance by the grammar of the language. Lexically complex anaphoric dependents, in contrast, can use the full descriptive resources of the language to give anaphoric information. This open-endedness permits dependents such as 'the senator mentioned above, who opposed the Wilderness bill and was dissuaded by his staff from expressing his stand'. The same contrast of lexical complexity applies to anaphoric initiators, so the indefinite description 'a Republican senator' can be compared with the proper name 'Leibniz' in the examples above.

Deploying these three independent functional distinctions—between anaphoric initiating tokens and dependent tokens, between cotypically intersubstitutable and cotypically nonintersubstitutable types, and between lexically complex and lexically simple types—yields eight roles that tokens can be thought of as playing in anaphoric chains. So among anaphoric initiators that are invariant under cotypical intersubstitution there are those that are lexically simple, such as proper names like 'Leibniz' as used above, and those that are lexically complex, such as 'the first U.S. president'. Among the cotypically nonintersubstitutable anaphoric initiators there are again the lexically simple such as 'this', and lexically complex indefinite descriptions, such as 'a Republican senator' in the example above. Among the anaphoric dependents that are not cotypically intersubstitutable one can similarly distinguish lexically simple pronouns such as 'it' from lexically complex dependent uses of definite descriptions, such as 'the man' in the very first example. Finally, among the anaphoric dependents that are invariant under cotypical intersubstitution one can distinguish some uses of lexically simple proper names, as in

#I met a man I'll call 'Binkley'. Binkley is a mechanic.#

from lexically complex dependents, which will be called *indirect definite descriptions.*

4. Anaphorically Indirect Descriptions

With the exception of the last category mentioned, this tripartite division just rearranges familiar facts about the linguistic behavior of standard kinds of singular terms. The categorization was presented, however, to introduce the notion of indirect definite descriptions—a kind of singular term whose existence has not generally been recognized. Indirect definite descriptions are accordingly characterized as lexically complex anaphoric dependents that are invariant under cotypical intersubstitution. From this specification it follows that expressions in this category are complex pronouns, as are ordinary anaphorically dependent definite descriptions. Unlike such descriptions, however, all cotypical tokens of expressions in this category are guaranteed to be coreferential with each other, since they all anaphorically depend upon and hence corefer with a single common antecedent token, and so with each other.

The idea is that an indirect definite description is a pronoun that actually contains a description specifying the term occurrence that is its anaphoric antecedent. Cotypical tokens of an indirect definite description type contain the same description and so (except in special cases) specify the same antecedent. One immediate expressive advantage of a language containing locutions of this sort would be that identities employing anaphorically indirect descriptions could be used to assert that two term *tokens* (or tokenings) were

coreferential, even if the tokens were of cotypically nonintersubstitutable types (such as indefinite descriptions or pronouns), for which, as Chastain showed, standard substitutional accounts of coreference fail, since they presuppose invariance under cotypical intersubstitution.

A useful picture of the functioning of these expressions (the picture that motivates calling them *indirect* descriptions) is offered by the indirect addressing function offered in most basic computer architectures. Ordinarily, the central processor uses addresses to pick out values, just as we use descriptions to pick out objects. But, in indirect mode, the CPU when given an address as an input does not return the value stored at that address as its output. Instead it treats that value as another address and returns the value stored in that second address as its output. Indirect descriptions are to be understood by analogy to this two-step process. First, a token is specified, perhaps by being described as to type and spatiotemporal location. But the token thus picked out is not the referent of the whole indirect description. For next, an indirectness operator is applied to that token specification to produce the indirect description, which only *anaphorically* refers to the specified token and so, as a whole, refers not to that token but rather to whatever that token (its anaphoric antecedent) refers to—just as with ordinary pronouns. The flexibility of the von Neumann computer architecture is in large part due to its capacity to treat the same expression both as datum (that is, as a value) and as instruction (the address at which a value can be found). Indirect descriptions exploit the analogous use/mention amphibiousness made possible by anaphora. The claim to be defended is that the expressive dividend that traditional *semantic* vocabulary pays in a language to which it is added consists in its performing this function.

To become entitled to claim that there actually are expressions in natural languages that should be understood as playing the anaphoric role just abstractly described, and to see what indirect descriptions have to do with specifically *semantic* vocabulary, it is necessary to look at some examples. Consider a discourse in which Joe says:

> #I should have known better than to let the mechanic Binkley work on my car. That airhead misadjusted the valves.#

Suppose that Jim, forgetting the name Joe used, later says:

> #For car repair, don't go to the mechanic Joe referred to as 'that airhead'.#

How should this latter remark be understood? In particular, how should one understand the singular term:

> (t) the mechanic Joe referred to as 'that airhead'?

Clearly this term refers to Binkley, Joe's hapless mechanic. But how is this

reference secured? The most obvious way to interpret such a singular term is as a straightforward definite description, by analogy to

> the mechanic who worked on Joe's car and misadjusted the valves.

In both cases some purportedly unique feature of Binkley is used to single him out—his relation to Joe either in being referred to by him in a certain way or in having abused his car in a certain way.

But the anaphoric category of complex cotypically nonintersubstitutable dependents and the brief discussion of anaphorically indirect definite descriptions suggest that an alternative analysis might be more illuminating. For the term (t) can be thought of as being an anaphoric dependent, having Joe's original token of 'that airhead' as its anaphoric antecedent. If tokens of the type of (t) are anaphorically dependent on the original token of 'that airhead', then they are coreferential with it and hence refer to Binkley the mechanic. On this account, (t) should be thought of as referring to Binkley in the way that a token of 'he' would, if Jim could arrange to ensure that the antecedent of that token of 'he' were Joe's tokening of 'that airhead'. Pronouns, as simply cotypically nonintersubstitutable anaphoric dependents, can take such antecedents if the antecedent and dependent tokens are sufficiently close to each other in time, space, or audience attention. But for distant antecedents, one may not simply rely on the meager resources grammar gives us to work backward from a simple dependent token such as 'he', which even with contextual supplementation can give us only so much information about its antecedent. Here, according to the current suggestion, is where indirect definite descriptions enter. For these locutions are grammatically complex, like ordinary definite descriptions, and enable the use of the full descriptive resources of the language to specify the antecedent token to which they are anaphorically linked.

In the example, the antecedent token is specified as that token whereby Joe referred to someone as 'that airhead', the token directly picked out by the phrase "Joe's utterance of 'that airhead'." Knowing what the individual was referred to *as* specifies the *type* of the antecedent tokening. Invoking Joe locates the particular token of that type that is in question. The presence of 'refer' marks the indirect-addressing feature, by which it is specified that the referent of the whole description is to be understood not to be the term token picked out as anaphoric antecedent but rather, as with simple pronouns, the referent of that antecedent token. Indirect definite descriptions such as (t) should be understood as complex pronouns (anaphoric dependents), and 'refers' and its cognates should be understood as complex anaphoric pronoun-forming operators.[35]

The 'refer' cognates consist of all the sorts of expressions that would normally be thought of as being used to assert semantic word-world rela-

tions. So the following examples ought to be understood according to the model of indirect or anaphoric descriptions: 'the philosopher John mentioned yesterday', 'the restaurant he talked about at the committee meeting', 'the difficulty discussed above', 'the person denoted by the second name on the list', 'the criminal described by the police in the morning paper', and 'the cluster of buildings Russell called "as like as monkeys can make" (to those at Cambridge)'.[36]

5. *Iterability*

Although there are important differences among these examples, all of them could be paraphrased so as explicitly to use some form of 'refer'. But even this rough characterization is of use only insofar as it is possible to say what is special about the functioning of 'refer' that would enable one, for instance, to tell whether some alien language possessed an expression playing an analogous role. Putting the question more generally, even if it turns out that one can properly account for the behavior of expressions like those in the examples according to the indirect-addressing model of anaphoric descriptions, how could one explain and justify enforcing such a radical distinction between the analyses of descriptions as apparently analogous to (t) as

> (u) the one Joe startled (insulted, deafened) by his remark about airheads?

Does not the most intuitive reading of (t) assimilate it to (u), treating both as ordinary definite descriptions of a man who in each case happens to be picked out by his relation to some utterance of Joe's? What difference between these cases *makes* the difference in virtue of which (t) should be treated as an indirect description, which essentially involves an anaphoric link, whereas (u) should be treated as an ordinary description, which uses a relation to an utterance to pick out an object? What is the crucial difference between being referred to by a certain token and being startled, insulted, or deafened by it?

The clearest manifestation of the difference in question concerns the *iteration* of pronoun-forming operators. Because the relation '. . . is an anaphoric dependent of . . .' is transitive, any operator that takes a term token and produces an expression that anaphorically depends on it should be iterable without change of resulting reference (assessed, as always, substitutionally). For tokens of the complex pronoun formed by applying the indirectness operator to (a token of) the result of applying that operator to an original initiating token should simply continue the anaphoric chain—dependents of dependents having the same original or ancestral antecedent.

Consider such iteration as applied to (t) and (u). If the description-forming

operators that produced these are iterated, with suitable variation of speakers, the results are:

> (t') the one John referred to as "the one Joe referred to as 'that airhead'"
> (u') the one John startled by his remark about the one Joe startled by his remark about airheads.

If descriptions formed in the appropriate way from 'refers' are anaphorically indirect descriptions, then, in virtue of the transparent iterability of anaphoric dependence, (t') ought to be coreferential (intersubstitutable) with (t) and, hence, with Joe's original tokening of 'that airhead'. And so they are, issues of speaker's reference aside.[37]

But though (t) and (t') are coreferential de jure, the superficially analogous (u) and (u') would be coreferential only by accident and under special circumstances.[38] These considerations can be formulated as the *iteration condition* (IC) below, which is a necessary condition for understanding an operator PF as a pronoun-forming operator. Subject to the conventions that a term designation surrounded by angle brackets forms a designation ⟨term⟩ of the *type* of that term, and that such a type designation surrounded by subscripted slashes forms a designation $/\langle\text{term}\rangle/_i$ of a particular token(ing) of that type, the iteration condition can be expressed:

(IC) $\quad PF(/\langle term\rangle/_i) = PF(/\langle PF(/\langle term\rangle/_i)\rangle/_j),$

where the identity sign marks the intersubstitutability of these expressions.[39] It is clear that nothing can be thought of as a pronoun-forming operator unless it meets this condition, which embodies the transitivity of anaphora. The strategy here will be to exploit such an *iterability* requirement (suitably qualified) as a sufficient condition for identifying operators that form indirect descriptions (which have been explained as lexically complex anaphoric dependents that are invariant under cotypical intersubstitution).

Enough weight will be placed on the strategy of transforming the iterability condition from a necessary into a sufficient condition for interpreting a syntactically relational expression as a complex pronoun-forming operator to make it worth stating precisely. Consider a construction that on the surface has the form:

> (v) the x [REF (x, $/\langle\text{term}\rangle/_i$)].

The overall expression appears to be a definite description that picks out a thing x by means of its relation REF to a token $/\langle\text{term}\rangle/_i$ of type ⟨term⟩. An example would be

> the man who was frightened when Bernadette uttered a token of type 'BOO'.

The iterability test says to consider terms of the form of ⟨v⟩ along with those of form

⟨v′⟩ the *y* [REF ⟨*y*, /⟨the *x* [REF ⟨*x*, /⟨term⟩/$_i$⟩]⟩/$_j$⟩],

as in

> the man who was frightened when Bernadette uttered a token of type 'the man who was frightened when Bernadette uttered a token of type "BOO"',

as well as ⟨t′⟩ and ⟨u′⟩.

The claim is that the syntactically relational expression REF here should be understood *not* as standing for a relation (as in an ordinary definite description) but as an anaphoric operator forming indirect descriptions, if and only if the following three conditions are met:[40]

1. *If* ⟨v⟩ is a proper description (that is, in fact picks out one and only one object) and if ⟨v′⟩ is a proper description, *then* they corefer (are intersubstitutable).
2. *If* the token by relation to which the individual in ⟨v′⟩ is picked out were *not* of the same type as the expression ⟨v⟩, *then* ⟨v⟩ and ⟨v′⟩ would not in general corefer.[41]
3. Accepting the identity statement by means of which the coreference of ⟨v⟩ and ⟨v′⟩ is asserted is not accidental, in the sense that it is a condition of being taken to understand the expressions involved.

The first condition is required because expressions of type ⟨v′⟩ need not always pick out unique objects, even when the expression of type ⟨v⟩ does. There need be no one who is the man Bernadette frightened by uttering a token of type 'the man who was frightened when Bernadette uttered a token of type "BOO"' (either because there is no such man or because there are too many), and similarly for genuinely anaphoric cases. Iterability is a relevant test in the (in general counterfactual) situations where the appropriate individuals exist. The second condition is required in order to rule out cases where the same individual is picked out no matter what token one looks at—the case where one and only one man is frightened, but he is frightened by *whatever* Bernadette says. The type of the intermediate antecedent of an anaphorically dependent expression is obviously essential to its having the reference that it has, so this condition represents a natural constraint. The third condition is required in order to rule out grammatically accidental coreference of ⟨v⟩ and ⟨v′⟩, as might happen in a psychologically homogeneous population with the relation 'is the first object one is reminded of on hearing the expression ⟨term⟩'.[42] Together these three conditions ensure that any expression REF that satisfies them may appropriately be understood as forming expressions of type ⟨v⟩, which ought to be understood as really having the form of complex anaphoric dependents, that is, as indirect definite descrip-

tions like (t), rather than as ordinary definite descriptions like (u). Frege placed great theoretical weight on the intersubstitutability of the terms 't' and 'the Bedeutung (or referent) of "t"', and this same essential redundancy feature of referring lies at the center of the present account.[43]

6. *Other Uses of 'Refers'*

The account so far has described the anaphoric category of indirect descriptions as a form of pronoun, has offered a formal test discriminating operators that generate expression types of this category, and has pointed out that 'refers' as it appears in contexts such as

> the one Joe referred to as 'that airhead'

can be understood as such a complex pronoun-forming operator. But there are other important uses of 'refers' and its cognates. The most fundamental of these are *Tarskian contexts*, such as

> 'Rabbits' refers to (denotes) rabbits;

denials of reference, such as

> (The expression) 'the present king of France' does not refer (or refers to no one);

mere reference claims, such as

> During his talk the speaker referred to Napoleon;

and *referential predications*, such as

> The speaker talked about shadowy figures from the intelligence community.

The strategy is to approach these locutions in two stages. First, each such usage is paraphrased into a form in which the 'refers' cognate appears *only* inside an indirect description. Then that description is explained as functioning as a complex pronoun, according to the story already told. The present concern is thus with the paraphrase in terms of indirect descriptions.

The generalization of the token-based account of indirect descriptions required for Tarskian contexts is really a simplification to a special case. For statements about what a term refers to or denotes presuppose that the term type in question is invariant under cotypical intersubstitutions—that is, that all cotypical tokens corefer. So the Tarskian claim

> The term 'Leibniz' denotes Leibniz

can be parsed as an identity involving an indirect description:[44]

> The one denoted by the term 'Leibniz' is (=) Leibniz.

Given the presupposition of invariance under cotypical intersubstitution of the type corresponding to 'Leibniz' in the original claim, this indirect description is equivalent to

> the one denoted by any token of 'Leibniz',

which may be straightforwardly understood as a complex pronoun, anaphorically dependent on an antecedent that may be any token of the specified type (for instance the one that appears on the other side of the identity sign). So the felt triviality of such reference claims is explained. Of course, reference claims involving expressions that are invariant under cotypical intersubstitution need not be epistemically trivial if different languages or different term types are involved, as in

> In our world (the expression) 'the first postmaster general' refers to Benjamin Franklin (or: the inventor of bifocals),

which can be understood as using anaphoric relations to claim

> In our world, the one referred to as 'the first postmaster general' is (=) Benjamin Franklin,

which is not a trivial assertion.

If Tarskian truth conditions are set up using denotation claims for semantic categories besides terms, these can be accommodated as well by this scheme.

> 'Red' refers to (denotes) red things

is to be read as

> The ones referred to as (denoted by) 'red' are red things.

Also,

> 'Magnetic' applies to (has in its extension) magnetic things

is to be read as

> The ones 'magnetic' applies to are magnetic things.

It was pointed out above that the prosentential account of '. . . is true' underwrites the Tarski biconditionals—that is, claims of the form

> 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

That all the biconditionals of this form be generated is, of course, the primary criterion of adequacy Tarski imposes on candidate conceptions of truth (or better, from the present point of view, conceptions of what is expressed by '. . . is true'). In his own formal theory of truth, he shows how these biconditionals can be recursively generated (in a first-order formal language) on the

basis of a finite number of primitive denotation relations expressed by statements of the form

'Benjamin Franklin' denotes Benjamin Franklin

and

'Red' denotes red things.

The account of 'refers' and 'denotes' as proform-forming operators underwrites all of these basis clauses of the Tarskian recursion in just the same way that the account of '. . . is true' underwrites the biconditionals that result. Furthermore, the basis clauses of the recursion do not have to be simply stipulated, one by one, in the way that Field finds theoretically objectionable.[45] Rather, they are generated in a principled way from an underlying anaphoric account of what reference claims express. That account deals gracefully with extensions of the language being considered and generalizes to deal with arbitrary languages. The anaphoric approach accordingly makes intelligible what McDowell has called "modest" Tarskian theories of truth. All that is presupposed is that one understands the various subsentential parts of speech involved (which is the subject of Chapter 6) and what anaphora is (which is the subject of Chapter 7). The present discussion proceeds subject to these promissory notes.

This account of Tarskian contexts in which 'refers' and its cognates appear respects the different modal status of

The term 'Leibniz' denotes Leibniz,

which is only contingently true, and

Leibniz is Leibniz,

which is necessarily true. For the possibility that the first claim is not true can be understood in terms of its paraphrase as the existence of a possible world *w* such that

The one referred to as 'Leibniz' in *w* is not Leibniz,

that is, is not the one we refer to in our own world as 'Leibniz'. The explicit relativization of the indirect description to a possible world simply specifies which world its antecedent tokens are to be found in. The candidate antecedents of

the one referred to as 'Leibniz' in *w*

are tokenings of the type 'Leibniz' that are uttered in *w*. The anaphoric approach accordingly has room for what has been thought of as the contingency of word-world semantic relations, although it is not based on such relations.

*Co*reference claims represent a simple variation on Tarskian contexts and

can be interpreted in much the same way. To say that the expressions ⟨type$_1$⟩ and ⟨type$_2$⟩ corefer is just to assert an identity between the corresponding indirect definite descriptions, that is, to say that the one referred to by (tokens of) ⟨type$_1$⟩ *is* the one referred to by (tokens of) ⟨type$_2$⟩. Asserting such an identity is licensing as (assertional) commitment-preserving the intersubstitution of expressions of those types. (The expressive role characteristic of identity locutions, making explicit substitution-inferential commitments, is discussed in Chapter 6.) In the case of cotypically nonintersubstitutable expressions such as demonstratives and pronouns, asserting an identity authorizes substitution of anaphoric dependents of the token on the left for anaphoric dependents of the token on the right of the identity, and vice versa. (The way in which anaphoric chains of such tokenings can play the same role in substitution inferences that classes of cotypical tokenings do for expressions that are suitably invariant is discussed in Chapter 7.)

It may be worth noticing that if attention is restricted to term types that are invariant under cotypical intersubstitution, the iteration test introduced above can be simplified correspondingly, by omission of token specifications. The necessary condition for operators PF to form complex pronouns that are invariant under cotypical intersubstitution is then:

$$PF(\langle PF(\langle type\rangle)\rangle) = PF(\langle type\rangle),$$

and the corresponding condition suggested as sufficient for REF to be an indirect description-forming operator is:

$$\text{the } y[\text{REF } (y, \langle \text{the } x[\text{REF } (x, \langle type\rangle)]\rangle)] = \text{the } x[\text{REF } (x, \langle type\rangle)].$$

Simple negations of statements of reference, as in

> (The expression) 'the shortest man in the room' does not refer to John,

raise no new issues, for the underlying identity that is being negated has already been explained. But claims that an expression does not refer to *anything* deserve special mention. The obvious way of extending to these cases the previous strategy of paraphrasing what look like assertions of reference relations as identities involving indirect descriptions is to quantify into the identity and read the result as a negative existential statement. That is, statements of the form

> ⟨type⟩ does not refer

are to be read as

> The one referred to as ⟨type⟩ does not exist,

where this last is to be understood in the same way as ordinary negative existentials, such as

> The present king of France does not exist.

(Just how existential and negative existential statements ought to be understood is discussed officially in Chapter 7.) That the indirect definite descriptions involved in denials of referentiality are anaphoric dependents makes no difference to the reading of the negative existentials, any more than it causes difficulty in understanding remarks like

> I would be comforted by the benevolence of a supreme being, except that such a being does not exist,

in which 'such a being' is an anaphoric dependent.

Statements like

> During his talk the speaker referred to Napoleon

say that reference has taken place but give no information about what the referring tokens or types were. Such remarks may be understood as asserting that there is *some* term tokening t in the speaker's discourse such that the item referred to by t is Napoleon. Statements like

> The speaker talked about shadowy figures from the intelligence community

are similar, except that a predication rather than an identity is what is asserted of the items referred to or talked about. This sentence says that there were tokenings t, t' (and perhaps more) such that the items referred to as (or talked about by the use of) t and t' are (have the property of being) shadowy figures from the intelligence community. These are predications involving pronouns, intrinsically no more mysterious than sentences like

> They are confused.

Common nouns can be formed from indirect descriptions just as they can be from ordinary direct descriptions, and the present account extends straightforwardly to these expressions, as in

> All the animals the speaker mentioned tonight were quadrupeds.

This example indicates as well how *generalizations* about reference are to be approached anaphorically. Endorsement of this claim commits one to all the substitution instances of the form

> If t is an animal the speaker mentioned tonight, then t is a quadruped.

The antecedent of each such conditional is a referential predication, equivalent to

> There is a term token /s/ such that the speaker uttered /s/ tonight and the item referred to by /s/ is an animal and the one referred to by /s/ is (=) *t*,

a kind of claim that has already been given an interpretation. As long as one knows what to make of each of the substitution instances to which a universally quantified claim undertakes commitment, one knows what to make of the universal generalization itself.

A full discussion of such cases requires accounts of anaphora and quantification that are not yet on the table. (The substitutional significance of such quantificational claims is discussed more fully in Chapter 6, and the account of anaphora is to be found in Chapter 7.) The complications arise in part from the recognition that in the general case the term substituend *t*, which is repeated in the specification above of the form of each sentential substitution instance of the quantification, would need to be replaced by two (not necessarily cotypical) term tokens, one of which is anaphorically dependent on the other. The present point is that although an account is not yet being offered of quantification in general, it is clear from the example that no new difficulties are added by the presence of anaphorically indirect descriptions in the quantificational substitution instances, so that generalizations about reference can be understood if any sort of generalization can.

Consideration of generalizations about what is referred to by various expressions makes salient another issue, which can be dealt with only in passing here, namely the susceptibility of an anaphoric account of reference claims to the formulation of semantic paradoxes. In the presumably analogous case of truth, a naive substitutional understanding of quantification into truth claims commits one to interpreting paradoxical sentences such as the Liar. Of course generalization is not the only way in which such paradoxical expressions can arise, nor is the possibility of semantic paradox restricted to the category of sentences. It is possible to use 'refer' to formulate empirically paradoxical term tokens, such as

> (w) the square root of 2 that is the result of multiplying −1 by the one referred to by the term token marked 'w',

where 'square root of 2' is a sortal comprising the positive and negative square roots and 'one' is understood as a prosortal anaphorically dependent upon it. Interpreting such tokens as anaphorically indirect descriptions focuses attention on grounding conditions for anaphoric inheritance—a large and important topic. In "Inheritors and Paradox," Dorothy Grover elaborates an anaphoric approach to semantic paradoxes for the closely analogous anaphoric treatment of '. . . is true' discussed above.[46] Grover finds that the natural condition on anaphoric grounding yields an interpretation coinciding

in general with the sentences that Kripke assigns a semantic value to at the minimal fixed point, the interpretation he takes to provide the most natural model for the intuitive concept of truth. Her remarks can be applied to the present construction by means of the crucial analogy between the pronominal account of reference and the prosentential account of truth.

V. THE FUNCTION OF TRADITIONAL SEMANTIC VOCABULARY IS EXPRESSIVE, NOT EXPLANATORY

1. Summary

The conclusions of the discussion of truth in Sections II and III may be summed up as follows. The pragmatists' approach to truth introduces a bold phenomenalist strategy—to take as immediate explanatory target the practical proprieties of *taking*-true and to understand the concept of truth as consisting in the use that is made of a class of expressions, rather than starting with a *property* of truth and then seeing what it is to express a concept used to attribute that property. Their implementation of this strategy is flawed in its exclusive attention to taking-true as a variety of *force* or pragmatic significance—as a doing, specifically an asserting of something. For 'true' is used in other contexts, for instance, embedded in the antecedent of a conditional; the semantic content that it expresses is accordingly not exhausted by its freestanding assertional uses. Content-redundancy theories can incorporate the insights of these force-redundancy accounts, and in their most sophisticated (anaphoric) form they account for the wider variety of uses of 'true'. Indeed, starting with an analogous pronominal account of 'refers' and 'denotes', it is possible to generate Tarski-wise the truth equivalences that jointly express the content redundancy of '. . . is true'. The strategy of the classical pragmatists has been vindicated at least this far: It is possible to account for truth talk without invoking a property of truth that such talk must be understood as answering to.

The project pursued in Section IV was to make it plausible that the use of 'refers' and cognate locutions in natural languages can be understood by first paraphrasing contexts in which they occur into a form in which they appear only inside indirect descriptions and then understanding their role in those paraphrases as operators taking token (or type) specifications and forming from them lexically complex pronouns invariant under cotypical intersubstitution, whose anaphoric antecedents are the specified tokens (or tokens of the specified type). This account of 'refers' as a pro*noun*-forming operator is evidently parallel to the account of '. . . is true' as a pro*sentence*-forming operator. Each theory explains the use of a bit of traditional *semantic* vocabulary in terms of the formation of *anaphoric* proforms. Indirect descriptions formed from 'refer' both *mention* a term expression (in picking our anaphoric antecedents) and *use* that expression. The effect of applying an indirect

description-forming operator to a mentioned term is that of turning the mentioned occurrence into a used occurrence. Thought of in this way, 'refers' is an *anaphoric disquotation operator* in the same sense that 'true' is.[47]

It should be acknowledged that this anaphoric account of the use of traditional semantic vocabulary does not underwrite all of the idioms that have pressed those expressions into service. There is one sort of truth and reference talk that is not recoverable on a prosentential and pronominal rendering of 'true' and 'refers'. Talk in which the substantive 'truth' appears in a way not easily eliminable in favor of 'true' will receive no construal by such theories. Yet philosophers do say such things as "Truth is one, but beliefs are many" and "Truth is a property definable in the language of some eventual physics," which are outside the scope of the account of 'true' offered here.[48] Similarly, although accounts are offered of what someone referred to by an utterance and of what the reference of the utterance was, nothing is said about the *relation* of reference. The anaphoric approach does not say how to understand sentences such as "Reference is a physical, causal relation." The reason is clear enough. On the anaphoric account, although '. . . is true' has the surface syntactic form of a predicate, and '. . . refers to . . .' the surface syntactic form of a relational locution, the grammatical and semantic roles these expressions play are not those of predicative and relational locutions. Their grammar is quite different; they are operators forming anaphoric dependents—namely prosentences and anaphorically indirect descriptions.

Philosophers have misconstrued ordinary talk using 'true' and 'refers' on the basis of a mistaken grammatical analogy to predicates and relational expressions. On the basis of this mistaken analogy (though the mistake is understandable, given the surface forms), they have hypostatized a property of truth and a relation of reference as the semantic correlates of the apparently predicative and relational expressions. Competing theories of the nature of this odd semantic predicate and relation have then been forthcoming. Such a search is of a piece with the search for the objects corresponding to each expression that plays the surface syntactic role of a singular term—for instance quantificational expressions such as 'someone' and 'everyone', or the 'it' in "It is raining." A more careful look at the (substitution-inferential) use of these expressions shows that the initial analogy to singular terms is misleading; a more careful look at the (anaphoric) use of 'true' and 'refers' similarly shows that the initially tempting assimilation of them to expressions of properties and relations is misleading.

One who endorses the anaphoric account of what is expressed by 'true' and 'refers' must accordingly eschew the reifying move to a truth property and a reference relation. A line is accordingly implicitly drawn by this approach between ordinary truth and reference talk and various specifically philosophical extensions of it based on theoretical conclusions that have been drawn from a mistaken understanding of what such talk expresses.

Ordinary remarks about what is true and what is false and about what some expression refers to are perfectly in order as they stand; the anaphoric account explains how they should be understood. But truth and reference are philosophers' fictions, generated by grammatical misunderstandings. It is no defect in the anaphoric account not to generate readings of the fundamentally confused remarks that result. Taking a claim to be true must be understood in the first instance as adopting a normative attitude—that is, endorsing the claim and so acknowledging a commitment. This normative attitude is presupposed by the possibility of ascribing an objective property and is not to be explained in terms of it.

Chapter 8 (Section VI) discusses in deontic scorekeeping terms what it is to ascribe objective properties, or more generally to make objectively representational claims—claims subject to objective assessments of correctness, depending on how things are with what is represented by them, regardless of the attitudes or endorsements of anyone. The expressive power of 'true' ensures that where an objective property is ascribed to something, the resulting claim can correctly be said to be objectively true or false. Properly understood, however, no property of truth (objective or otherwise) is being invoked by such a remark. One who asserts "The claim that all integers are the sum of at most nineteen fourth powers is objectively true" ascribes an objective property to the integers, but not to the claim. Navigating in the idiom that distinguishes these (endorsing the first specification of the ascription and not the second) is a somewhat delicate matter. The discussion below of the concept of a *fact* may be helpful in acquiring this skill.

Parallel remarks may be made about a supposed word-world relation of reference. The present account distinguishes sharply between expressions and their referents—where that latter expression is understood as shorthand for 'what is referred to by those expressions'. For very different uses are associated with the expressions 'the expression "Leibniz"' and 'the referent of the expression "Leibniz"'. In particular, although doxastic commitments are preserved by intersubstitution of the latter with the singular term 'Leibniz', they are not preserved by intersubstitution of the former with 'Leibniz'. That is, Leibniz is (=) the one referred to by the expression 'Leibniz', but Leibniz is not the expression 'Leibniz'. These remarks will not officially be intelligible until the substitution-inferential role of singular terms has been explained (in Chapter 6), and the relation between anaphoric dependents and their antecedents has been explained in terms of inheritance of substitution-inferential role (in Chapter 7). For present purposes it suffices to say that treating tokens of the type ⟨the referent of the expression 'Leibniz'⟩ as anaphorically dependent on tokens of the type ⟨Leibniz⟩ commits one to the propriety of the intersubstitution that would be made explicit by endorsement of the assertible identity

Leibniz is (=) the referent of the expression 'Leibniz'

and does not commit one to the propriety of the intersubstitution that would be made explicit by endorsement of the assertible identity

Leibniz is (=) the expression 'Leibniz'.

So although anaphora is an *intra*linguistic (or word-word) relation, adopting an anaphoric account of 'refers' as a proform-forming operator does not entail conflating linguistic items with extralinguistic items. No doubt, as with any other two items in the causal order, there are many relations that can correctly be said to obtain between a term tokening and what it refers to. But the present considerations show that talk about referring and referents provides no reason whatever to conclude that some one of these could be singled out as *the* reference *relation*—that unique semantically significant word-world relation in virtue of which the nonexpression is the referent of the expression. Various word-world relations play important explanatory roles in theoretical semantic projects, but to think of any one of these as what is referred to as "the reference relation" is to be bewitched by surface syntactic form.

In order to see what is and is not being claimed for this analysis of 'true' and 'refers' and to see the significance of the replacement of an account of a truth *property* and a reference *relation* by anaphoric accounts of what those traditional semantic locutions express, it is helpful to redescribe and clarify the explanatory role that the anaphoric analysis is supposed to play. Suppose that from some language-in-use such as English one extrudes all the sentences that contain specifically *semantic* vocabulary, such as 'true' and 'refers' and other words used in the same ways.[49] The anaphoric analysis presented in this chapter permits the extension of an account of the use of this *non*semantic fragment of the language to an account of the use of the whole language. Put otherwise, it explains how to add the expressive power provided by traditional semantic vocabulary to a set of linguistic practices that does not have such locutions. In particular, once the account (in Chapters 3 and 4) of discursive practices, the pragmatic significances they institute, and the semantic contents they confer has been extended (in Chapter 6) to incorporate the substitution-inferential commitments governing the use of subsentential expressions, and (in Chapter 7) to the anaphoric inheritance of such commitments, the considerations advanced in this chapter then suffice to incorporate 'true' and 'refers' into the deontic scorekeeping model of linguistic practice.

2. *Semantic Deflationism*

This is a *deflationary* account of the role of traditional semantic vocabulary, paradigmatically 'true' and 'refers'. Three deflationary consequences of the anaphoric approach to such vocabulary are particularly noteworthy. First, it is denied that there is a *property* of truth or a *relation* of

reference. Second, it is denied that claims expressed using traditional semantic vocabulary make it possible for us to state specifically *semantic facts*, in the way that claims expressed using the vocabulary of physics, say, make it possible for us to state specifically *physical facts*. Third, it is denied that the notion of *truth conditions* can be appealed to in explaining (as opposed to expressing) the sort of *propositional contents* expressed by declarative sentences—and similarly that the notion of *association with a referent* can be appealed to in explaining the sort of semantic contribution the occurrence of a singular term makes to the contents of sentences in which it appears.

It will help in clarifying the status and significance of these denials to consider them in connection with a significant structural difficulty that Boghossian has diagnosed as afflicting many forms of deflationism.[50] He points out that corresponding to each of the three sorts of claims just rehearsed there is a danger of deflationism undercutting itself and lapsing into incoherence. The general worry is that the force of deflationist claims depends on the contrast between predicates (such as '. . . has a mass of more than ten grams') that do, and those (such as '. . . is true') that do not, correspond to properties—and declarative sentences (such as "Snow is white") that do, and those (such as "It is true that snow is white") that do not, state facts. But such contrasts seem to presuppose a robust correspondence theory of the contents of some predicates and claims—at least those the semantic deflationist finds unproblematic, paradigmatically those of natural science. Deflationary approaches to semantics seem to be saying: physical predicates correspond to physical properties and relations, but semantic predicates do not correspond to semantic properties and relations; physical claims have truth conditions and if true correspond to physical facts, but semantic claims do not have truth conditions and so cannot correspond to semantic facts. Yet at the same time, the deflationists want to deny that content can be explained in terms of truth conditions and correspondence to facts, properties, and objects.

So, it is claimed, deflationary approaches are conceptually unstable. Consistently following out the rejection of robust correspondence theories of content requires treating using an expression as a predicate as all there is to expressing a property, and using a declarative sentence to make a true claim to be all there is to stating a fact. So on a deflationary construal, one is forbidden to deny that the predicate '. . . is true' denotes a property, or that the claim "It is true that snow is white" states a semantic fact. Yet it is the essence of deflationism to deny these claims. So the very intuitions that deflationism seeks to develop and defend surreptitiously presuppose exactly the sort of robust truth-conditional correspondence theory of content they are concerned to reject.

These considerations present a serious challenge to many ways of pursuing the program of semantic deflationism, but the approach that has been presented here is immune to them. The first argument depends on treating

'. . . is true' as a predicate. If it is, then since that expression is used to make claims and state facts, it must, on deflationary accounts, be taken to express a property. But the essence of the anaphoric versions of semantic deflationism is precisely to take issue with this grammatical presupposition. According to the account endorsed here, '. . . is true' expresses a prosentence-forming operator. Its syntax and grammar are quite distinct from those of predicates, to which it bears only the sort of surface similarity that quantificational expressions bear to genuine singular terms. In particular, pro-form-forming operators such as those formed using 'true' and 'refers' are syntactically distinguished from superficially similar predicates and relational expressions by the iteration condition. The part of speech '. . . is true' is assimilated to by these theories does not have a directly denotational semantics but inherits its significance anaphorically, by an entirely distinct mechanism.

So when it is claimed here that '. . . is true' does not express a property, this means that it is not even of the right grammatical form to do so—anymore than 'no one' is of the right form to pick out an individual, although there are some features of its use that could mislead one on this point. Furthermore, this claim is not made ad hoc, to avoid the sort of theoretical circularity Boghossian points out, but is motivated by ground-level considerations having to do with the use of 'true' and 'refers' that, it is claimed, cannot otherwise adequately be represented. Thus from this point of view, the argument to the effect that: "the denial that a given predicate refers to or expresses a property only makes sense on a robust construal of predicate reference . . . But if this is correct, the denial . . . that the truth predicate refers to a property must itself be understood as framed in terms of a robust notion of reference"[51] depends upon the ultimately incorrect presupposition that truth is properly rendered as a predicate. Given this, the second claim does not follow from the first. It can be granted that denying of a predicate that it expresses a property presupposes a robust conception, without being committed thereby to anything about how '. . . is true' ought to be understood.

3. *Facts Are True Claims*

What, then, about the sentential level, at which claims are made and facts stated? Is the semantic "nonfactualism" (Boghossian's term) of the deflationist incoherent? In assessing this claim, it is important to distinguish two different ways in which one might adopt a nonfactualist attitude toward what is claimed by "It is true that snow is white." According to the usage endorsed here, facts are just true claims.[52] That is, phenomenalistically, to call something a fact is just to take it to be true. 'Claims' here has the semantic sense of what is claim*ed*, rather than the pragmatic sense of the claim*ing* of it—a matter of content, not of force or deontic attitude. Thus to

say that facts are just true claims does not commit one to treating the facts as somehow dependent on our claimings; it does not, for instance, have the consequence that had there never been any claimers, there would have been no facts. (There are no possible situations in which there would have been no facts. A situation or set of circumstances just is one sort of set of facts.)

This notion of facts as true claims is meant to contrast with a view of them as what *makes* claims true—at least where that latter formula is conceived as potentially of *explanatory* use, rather than as providing an *expressive* equivalent. To say that it is the *fact* that *p* that *makes* it *true* that *p* (or that it is true that *p because* of the fact that *p*) is to provide an *explanation* only in the misleading sense in which what *makes* it the case that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea is that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea—the sense in which the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea *because* the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea.

In a certain sense, facts are what make claim*ings* true. But claim*ings* are true at all only in a derivative sense: We say "What you say is true," not "Your saying of it is true." Your saying can be speaking tru*ly*, but that is just saying something (making a claim) that is true. Talk of facts as what *makes* claims true is confused if it is thought of as relating two distinct things—a true claim and the fact in virtue of which it is true—in such a way that the former might be *explained* by appeal to the latter. Rather, "The claim that *p* is true" and "It is a fact that *p*" are two equivalent ways of saying the same thing—expressing the *same* content, and so (if the claim they both express is true) stating the *same* fact.

Truth claims can be true, so some of them state facts. (For the reasons rehearsed above, this does not entail that there is a property of truth.) So far this does not sound "nonfactualist." Yet it is denied that there are any specifically *semantic* facts. "It is true that snow is white" expresses just the same fact that "Snow is white" expresses. The former uses anaphoric mechanisms to do so; its expression of that fact can thus involve presuppositions that are not involved in the latter expression (as becomes obvious if one considers other forms of truth claim), but these need not be considered part of the fact that is stated, any more than the differences involved in interpreting "Snow is white" and "La neige est blanche" or, under the right circumstances, "John is confused" and "He is confused" mean that these do not express the same fact.

Physical claims do state specifically physical facts because they essentially employ specifically physical predicates and so invoke specifically physical properties and relations. Semantic claims do not state specifically semantic facts because their use of specifically semantic vocabulary does not invoke specifically semantic properties and relations. This sounds like it ought to be called "nonfactualism" about truth talk. The distinction that must be kept in mind is that between claiming that "Snow is white is true"

states a fact (which deflationists had better not deny, for the reasons Boghossian points out) and claiming that it states a special *kind* of fact, namely a semantic fact. The 'deflating' part of deflationism can consist in its denial of this latter claim. Mastering the vocabulary of physics (or for that matter, etiquette) gives us expressive access to a range of facts we cannot otherwise express. Mastering semantic vocabulary just gives us a new way (useful for other reasons, having to do with communication and generalization) of getting at a range of nonsemantic facts we already had access to. This is just the point of redundancy deflationism. "It is true that snow is white" is a semantic *expression* of a nonsemantic fact.

In this connection it is worth making a third point about Boghossian's arguments against semantic deflationism. He thinks that the moral we should draw is that "we really cannot make sense of the suggestion that our thoughts and utterances do not possess robust truth conditions."[53] If contents must be explained as truth conditions, then an argument that such truth conditions cannot be understood in a deflationary way amounts to an argument that they, and so contents, must be construed robustly. But one could equally well conclude that one ought not to explain propositional contentfulness in terms of truth conditions. As Dummett argued long ago, anyone who holds to a deflationary theory of truth is precluded from explaining propositional contents in terms of truth conditions. For redundancy theories of 'true' presuppose the contentfulness of the nonsemantic sentences on which semantic claims are redundant, in order to explain how 'true' ought to be used. It would be circular to presuppose such contents in an account of truth, if the contents are themselves to be construed in terms of what then must be an antecedently intelligible notion of what it is to be true. If one can make robust antecedent sense of truth, then one can appeal to it to explain contents without circularity (a big 'if'). If, however, one is a deflationist about truth, then it is necessary to look elsewhere for the basic concepts one appeals to in explaining contentfulness. That is the line that has been pursued in this work.

One can say of anything that has a propositional content that it has truth conditions. According to the relaxed deflationary view, this characterization is just a harmless compliment paid to things whose contents can be expressed in declarative sentences or by the corresponding 'that' clauses (picked out in turn by their special role in the practice of making assertions). But it is one thing to say that whatever is contentful will, in consequence, have truth conditions. It is quite another to think that one could use the possession of truth conditions as part of an *explanation* of propositional contentfulness. As Dummett recognized, this latter strategy is forbidden to deflationists, on grounds of circularity. Deflationists ought to acknowledge the general possibility of *expressing* semantic content truth-conditionally, while denying the possibility of *explaining* semantic content truth-conditionally.

4. Correspondence, Constraint, and Representation

From the perspective provided by this way of talking, then, correspondence theories of truth are unsatisfactory because they are unenlightening, rather than because they are false. True claims do correspond to facts, and understanding claims does require grasp of what the facts must be for those claims to be true. For when the 'ing'/'ed' ambiguity is resolved, these theses take one of two forms. If 'claim' is understood as what is claimed, true claimable contents just *are* facts; the relation of 'correspondence' is just that of identity. For that reason, grasp of such contents can be identified with grasp of what the facts must be for them to be true. But the basic question is what one must be able to *do* in practice in order to count as grasping or understanding an assertible (hence propositional) content. Paraphrases in terms of corresponding facts serving as truth conditions provide no independent explanatory grip on the issue—only an alternate way to express it.

If 'claim' is understood as the act of claiming, rather than the content claimed, however, true claim(ing)s can be said to correspond to facts in a stronger sense. They *express* those facts; they are the acts of making explicit, in virtue of whose significance as acknowledgments of inferentially articulated commitments anything at all can be understood as a claimable—and hence, if true, as a fact. In exactly the same sense, false claims express their claimable contents. In either case, scorekeeping mastery of the significance of claimings depends on one's grasp of the claimed contents. This is, trivially, grasp of what (claimable contents) must be true, what the facts must be, if the claiming is to be a true-claiming—a claiming of a true claimable content.

The important thing to get clear about is what it is for an act of claiming to express a claimable content, that is, the activity of making something explicit. Once the expressive role of 'true' and 'fact' is properly understood, it becomes apparent that their use presupposes a notion of propositional content (hence of propositionally contentful acts and states); so what such traditional semantic vocabulary expresses is not in principle available to *explain* the nature of propositional contentfulness. Their parasitic expressive role precludes their playing a fundamental semantic explanatory role.[54] By contrast (as Chapter 3 shows) it is possible to explain the practical significance of acts of claiming, and so to approach the propositional contents they express, without appealing to notions of truth conditions or fact. The use of expressions such as 'true' and 'fact' can then (as this chapter shows) be explained in terms of these same social practices of giving and asking for reasons.

On neither of these construals of claims is there room for a robust correspondence between facts and claims. What the facts are does not depend on what claimings we actually effect. But the worry may remain that a semantic idiom that identifies facts with true claims (via the identification of taking to be a fact with taking to be true, that is, with acknowledging a doxastic

commitment) must inevitably 'lose the world'—trading its solidity for a froth of words. A threatening idealism of linguistic practice seems to be implicit in such an identification.

But this is a misplaced concern. What must not be lost is an appreciation of the way in which our discursive practice is empirically and practically *constrained.* It is not up to us which claims are true (that is, what the facts are). It is in a sense up to us which noises and marks express which claims, and hence, in a more attenuated sense, which express true claims. But empirical and practical constraint on our arbitrary whim is a pervasive feature of our discursive practice. Words form a distinct and largely independent realm within the world—in the sense not only that the nonlinguistic facts could be largely what they are even if the specifically linguistic facts (thought of as a class of facts about words) were quite different, but also in the sense that the words—as noises, marks, and so on—could be largely what they are, even if the nonlinguistic facts were quite different. But discursive *practices* as here conceived do not stand apart from the rest of the world in this way. The nonlinguistic facts could be largely what they are, even if our discursive practices were quite different (or absent entirely), for what claims are true does not depend on anyone's claiming of them. But our discursive practices could not be what they are if the nonlinguistic facts were different.

For those practices are not things, like words conceived as marks and noises, that are specifiable independently of the objects they deal with and the facts they make it possible to express. Discursive practices essentially involve to-ing and fro-ing with environing objects in perception and action. The conceptual proprieties implicit in those practices incorporate both empirical and practical dimensions. All our concepts are what they are in part because of their inferential links to others that have noninferential circumstances or consequences of application—concepts, that is, whose proper use is not specifiable apart from consideration of the facts and objects that responsively bring about or are brought about by their application. The normative structure of authority and responsibility exhibited by assessments and attributions of reliability in perception and action is causally conditioned.

This sort of causal contribution to the norms implicit in discursive practice means that even though it is the practices of a linguistic community that make their words express the concepts they do, the members of the community may be understood to have undertaken commitments by using those words that outrun their capacity to recognize those commitments. Earthlings and twin-earthlings may apply the same phonetic and orthographic sign design 'water' to samples of clear, tasteless, odorless, thirst-quenching liquids on their respective planets (and may make corresponding inferential moves with them to and from other sign-designs) and still be understood (by us, who are describing the case) to be applying different *concepts* thereby, if the noninferential circumstances of appropriate application of their concept involves the presence of XYZ rather than H_2O. This can be so even if neither

earthlings nor twin-earthlings can be trained reliably to discriminate XYZ from H_2O perceptually.

Practitioners are not in general omniscient about the commitments implicit in their own concepts. For the interpreter who is making sense of their practices—and who *is* able (not necessarily perceptually, but conceptually) to distinguish H_2O and XYZ—can understand transported earthlings as *mis*taking for water the XYZ they look at, as *in*appropriately applying the concept they express with their word 'water' to that unearthly stuff.[55] As with assessments of reliability, truth, and knowledge generally, the 'externalist' element in attributions of commitments implicit in conceptual contents reflects the social difference in perspective between the scorekeeper and those whose normative statuses are at issue. One can (according to an interpreter or scorekeeper) have bound oneself by one's practice, in part because of the things one was actually dealing with, in such a way that using a particular word is correct in one circumstance and incorrect in another—even when the individual so bound cannot tell the situations apart.

Discursive practices incorporate actual things. They are solid—as one might say, *corporeal:* they involve actual bodies, including both our own and the others (animate and inanimate) we have practical and empirical dealings with. They must not be thought of as hollow, waiting to be filled up by things; they are not thin and abstract, but as concrete as the practice of driving nails with a hammer. (They are our means of access to what is abstract—among other things—not its product.) According to such a construal of practices, it is wrong to contrast discursive practice with a world of facts and things *outside* it, modeled on the contrast between words and the things they refer to. It is wrong to think of facts and the objects they involve as constraining linguistic practice from the outside—not because they do not constrain it but because of the mistaken picture of facts and objects as outside it. What determinate practices a community has depends on what the facts are and on what objects they are actually practically involved with, to begin with, through perception and action. The way the world is, constrains proprieties of inferential, doxastic, and practical commitment in a straightforward way from *within* those practices.[56] So if I perceive a liquid as tasting sour, infer that it is an acid, infer further that it will therefore turn litmus paper red, and, intending to match a red pigment sample, accordingly dip litmus paper in the liquid, I may nonetheless subsequently acquire perceptually a commitment to the result being a blue, rather than a red, piece of paper, and hence an acknowledgment of my practical failure. In this way I can find myself with incompatible commitments (which need to be sorted out if I am to remain entitled to any of my commitments in the vicinity). The possibility of incompatible commitments arising from the cycle of perception, inference, action, and perception reflects the way the normative structure of perception and action incorporates elements of the causal order.

As a result, empirical and practical constraints get built into what commitments (including inferential commitments) one can sustain entitlement to.

Thus a demotion of semantic categories of correspondence relative to those of expression does not involve 'loss of the world' in the sense that our discursive practice is then conceived as unconstrained by how things actually are. It does involve giving up the picture of how things are as contrasting with what we can say and think. Facts are (the contents of) true claims and thoughts. As Wittgenstein says: "When we say, and *mean*, that such-and-such is the case, we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this-is-so."[57] What is lost is only the bifurcation that makes knowledge seem to require the bridging of a *gap* that opens up between sayable and thinkable contents—thought of as existing self-contained on their side of the epistemic crevasse—and the worldly facts, existing on their side.[58] What the picture of facts as true claims loses is only "the little rift within the lute, / that by and by will make the music mute, / and ever widening slowly silence all."[59]

The world is everything that is the case, a constellation of facts. But as the author of these words hastened to point out, those facts are structured and interconnected by the objects they are facts about; they are articulated by the properties and relations the obtaining of which is what we state when we state a fact (claim when we make a claim). To make a claim is to say that things are thus and so—that is, to talk about objects, and to say how they are propertied and related. Propositional contents (and hence facts) cannot be properly understood without understanding their representational dimension—what it means for them to be *about* objects and their properties and relations. The next three chapters accordingly show how to move from an account of the *expression* of facts to an account of the *representation* of objects and properties.